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
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
CHIEF ANCIENT
PHILOSOPHIES

*THE ETHICS
OF ARISTOTLE*

REV. J. G. SMITH, M.A.



438



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CHIEF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHIES.

THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE.

BY

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"Il Maestro di color che sanno."

DANTE, "Inferno," iv. 131.

P R E F A C E.

THIS is an attempt to tabulate from the "Ethics" the opinions of Aristotle on several questions of paramount importance, which are widely discussed at the present time, and to set his opinions side by side with those of some eminent modern philosophers. Perhaps in doing this something may be done towards indicating that "Scientific basis of morality,"¹ which is desired in many quarters. I have tried to be on my watch against the danger, to which commentators are specially exposed, of importing into the mind of their author opinions, which are really their own, not his.

It would be a grave injury to moral philosophy, if Aristotle were left out of consideration by moralists, or displaced in the studies of our Universities.

In a work, which though of small compass, has

¹ "The establishment of rules of right conduct on a scientific basis is a pressing need."—H. SPENCER, "Data of Ethics," p. iii.

occupied many years (so far as other duties permitted), it would not be easy to enumerate all those, to whom I am under obligation. But I would mention particularly the very sensible "Commentary on the 'Ethics'"¹ by the late accomplished Principal of the University of Edinburgh, as more really helpful to the student, than some more ambitious treatises. After all, the old saying is true, "Aristotelem non nisi ex ipso Aristotele intelliges."

The Appendices A, C, G (in part), H, I, J, are from an essay, which I contributed some years ago to a Quarterly Review.

The references to the "Ethics" are to the divisions of chapters in Grant's 3rd edition, 1874.

I have endeavoured to compress what I would say.

I. G. S.

MALVERN, *Feb.*, 1886.

¹ "The Ethics of Aristotle." By Sir Alexander Grant, Bart., &c. &c.

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INTRODUCTION.

It might seem superfluous, when ethical questions are discussed, to call attention to the Ethics of Aristotle, were it not, that he is in some danger of being overlooked now in England. However far behind he may be left by the progress of knowledge in many departments, he may still be worth hearing on questions of morality and conduct. In regard to these the advance made by philosophy is rather in the art, than in the science, in the application of principles rather than in the principles themselves; ethical philosophy, as has been well said, being assimilative rather than progressive. There are indeed some characteristics of the Aristotelian philosophy, which bring it very near to modern thought on these subjects; while the terseness of his style is a relief to those, who are accustomed to modern diffuseness.

Aristotle's method of reasoning is mainly inductive. He has been called the inventor of the syllogism;¹ he may as fairly be said to have anticipated the inductive process of Bacon. With him analysis precedes synthesis; observation furnishes the mate-

¹ Appendix A.

rials for generalising; his major premiss is based on the collation of particular instances. Partly, perhaps, by recoil from the transcendental theorisings of his great rival, partly from natural temperament, Aristotle prefers the comparative certainty, solid, precise, definite, which experience alone can give. He starts from what he knows and rises from the bare fact to the potentiality of the principle which it embodies and exemplifies. In ethics he is content to take what he finds ready to hand, a practical consent, so far as he knows, as to what is praiseworthy and what is not. He will not even say, that there is any necessity to know the reason.¹

His data may be insufficient and, therefore, his summary imperfect and his inference faulty, but, at any rate, the method, which he proposes to himself, is the method, which modern science commends. His method has been discredited by the rigid technicalities and minutely-elaborated deductions of the schoolmen; but in itself it is, essentially, to ascend from what we know to what we know not.²

If the horizon, which Aristotle surveyed, is contracted in comparison with that, which science surveys now, at least he is eminently cautious in his assertions. So far as he knows, he affirms or denies, and no farther. If the major premiss in any of his arguments is invalidated by the inadequacy of the induction, on which it rests, he would be the first to admit, that the conclusion is good, only so far as the pre-

¹ "Ethics," I. vii. 20.

² "Ethics," I. iv. 6.

misses go. His reticence makes what he says all the more valuable. The reservation and the limitation, which continually qualify his assertion, are a safeguard against an overweening gnosticism. A favourite phrase with him, so far as a thing "is what it is,"¹ contains an important limitation of universal applicability for judging rightly. His philosophy abounds in distinctions, not purely dialectical, not mere refinements of language, but thoroughly practical. He insists on the difference for practical purposes between the absolute and the relative, the abstract and the concrete, the objective, as it is termed now, and the subjective.² The very staple of his teaching is, that our knowledge is limited; that things as they are to us, not as they may be in themselves, are what we are concerned with. His is a healthy agnosticism. He writes as one feeling his way from facts to theory.

Thus his use of induction and his tentative manner of using it bring Aristotle into sympathy with European philosophy at the present day. Another point of contact, less easily apprehended but not less important, is, that his teaching implies, if it does not express, the essential unity of the material and the spiritual world. More and more science discovers the ubiquity of law; more and more religion recognises the living presence, the continuous operation

¹ "Ethics," X. vii. 6.

² 'Απλῶς, πρὸς τι' ἀπλῶς, ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων καθόλου, τὰ καθέκαστα· ἀπλῶς, πρὸς ἡμᾶς κατ' ἀλήθειαν, ἐκάστω. "Form" and "matter" in Aristotle do not coincide with "subject" and "object" in modern philosophy.

of God in nature. The trenchant line of demarcation, drawn by the exaggerated subjectivity of Kant and Coleridge on the one hand, and by an exaggerated materialism on the other, disappears ; and the problem is now, how to reconcile the apparently heterogeneous manifestations of one and the same power. Aristotle may not contribute much to the solution, but at least he reminds,—that the problem must be faced and solved.

It has been objected, that Aristotle's opinions on the relation of intellectual to moral progress, on the comparative excellence of thought and action, on the true functions of the State are superseded by the doctrine of averages, by the theories of social science, or because the British empire is a larger and more complicated organisation than Athens or Sparta. But to reason thus is surely to forget, that the averages of what is called "sociology" are made up of individuals,¹ and that the political life of a tiny community is the life of a larger community in miniature, Florence or Athens being a microcosm in itself. Aristotle² can never be superseded. His calm, clear accents make themselves heard across centuries of controversy.³

¹ "The properties of its members determine the properties of the mass."—H. SPENCER, "Study of Sociology," p. 52.

² Appendix B.

³ For an historic sketch of the influence of the Aristotelian philosophy, see GRANT, "Ethics of Aristotle," I.

THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE.

CHAPTER I.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE ETHICS.

The Intellect.—In analysing the attributes of humanity, Aristotle distinguishes the intellect from the emotions as separable in conception even if not separable actually. This is, indeed, in one aspect, the very foundation of his ethical philosophy. He sees clearly, by observing what takes place in himself and others, that, whenever brought into contact with things or persons other than himself, man experiences a two-fold sensation; intellectually he is aware of their existence, and emotionally he is attracted to them or repelled. In other words, he has the faculty of discriminating between himself and all that is extraneous to him and the faculty of liking or disliking, whatever is presented to him.

Aristotle recognises, of course, that there are other processes and operations in man, which are more mechanical, for instance the assimilation and digestion of food. But these vegetative faculties, though intimately connected with the higher faculties, and subsidiary to their being in good order, he

regards as outside the question, what is the proper excellence of man?¹ They are busiest, he says, in sleep,² at the very time, when the higher functions are in abeyance.

If this vegetative element in the nature of man is taken into account, the division, which Aristotle makes, is threefold. There is the reason; there are the affections unreasoning indeed, but receptive of the influence, which reason exercises; there are these altogether unreasoning and merely mechanical faculties (p. 38). But practically the reason and the affections are all, that we are concerned with now.

With Aristotle the intellect is what especially constitutes man; because with him the intellect is normally the dominant faculty. He assumes, without proof, this superiority of the intellect.³ By the intellect the conduct is to be checked, guided, controlled. It is the arbiter of truth and falsity; it stands, as will be seen, for will and conscience.⁴ It is the recipient of the impressions produced by phenomena through the senses (for Aristotle does not favour the doctrine of innate intuitions), and thence it evolves the varying

¹ "Ethics," I. xiii. 6.

² Dreams, like drunkenness, seem to reveal the natural propensities rather than the acquired.

³ Cf. FERRIER, "Lectures on Greek Philosophy," I. p. 382.

⁴ The kind of education encouraged by the Edgeworths in these islands and by Madame de Genlis in France is a practical illustration of the results to be expected from making the intellect the mainspring of action, vanity in the one case, self-respect in the other, being the motive, rather than simple obedience.

combinations, into which these impressions are sorted and grouped, the almost endless complications of thought, acting and reacting one on another. In those later books of the Ethics, where his master-hand may be traced in the outlines,¹ even if a pupil has filled in the details, he classifies the functions of the intellect according to the materials, which it handles, science strictly so called dealing with things certain, art, in his sense of the word, dealing with whatever is problematic.²

It has been well said,³ "objects of abstract thought," according to Aristotle, "come from within, not from without," only so far, as "they are presented by the imagination to the reason."⁴ With him, "sensation and ideation [*sic*] are analogous"; "perception is homogeneous with highest thought"; "elementary sensations pass into complex reasonings by imperceptible gradations." If it grows more and more evident, as physical science penetrates more and more deeply into the secrets of the life physical, that causality reigns in mental phenomena, and if

¹ GRANT, "Ethics," I. 63; II. 95.

² Ἐπιστήμη, τέχνη. Cf. τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν, τὸ λογιστικόν, in "Ethics," VI. i.

³ WESTMINSTER REVIEW, New Series, LX. 351-565.

⁴ Even mathematical science bears witness to this theory. No study is more purely abstract, and yet it would not be easy to prove, that the primary principles of notation are really from any other source than the senses. The idea of numbers is but the perception through the senses of two or more objects, which are felt to be distinct. Aristotle would not accept the theory of Schopenhauer and others, that phenomena are subjective.

experimental psychology can refute loose assertions of mind being purely immaterial, by detecting molecular action in mental operations, still the vital question of man's free agency and responsibility remains untouched by these discoveries, so long as they do not disprove his power to choose, what to accept, what to reject of the thoughts and wishes presented to him by a mechanical and material process. If a man is a machine, at any rate he is himself the driver of it.

The Emotions.—But the intellect, Aristotle allows, cannot by itself impel to action ; it is, by itself, only a passive, though a critical, looker on.¹ The affections supply the impulse, the motive force, the fire, which sets the machinery going. Rightly or wrongly, wisely or foolishly, for good or for evil, they prompt, incite, urge, importune. They are the tendrils, by which the creeping plant feels its way among the objects, which it encounters ; they are the tentacles, which the living creature thrusts out to grasp or to reject, whatever comes in its way. Just as all the senses may be resolved into touch and as all knowledge resolves itself ultimately into the apprehension of identity or non-identity, so all the multitudinous emotions, which contend for mastery in man, love, hate, hope, fear, joy, sorrow, and the rest, are only modifications of one and the same principle at work, an instinctive movement towards, or an instinctive shrinking from something. How to know, when to

¹ "Ethics," VI. ii. 5.

approach, when to draw back, they need, according to Aristotle, the guidance of the intellect. It is, he says, from the co-operation of these emotional forces with the intellect, or rather from their being duly directed by it, that all moral excellence issues.¹ Whatever may be the diversities of temperament, in the Peripatetic philosophy the intellect rules, the passions obey.

Dualism.—The stress, which Aristotle lays on the distinction between intelligence and emotion exposes him to the charge of “dualism”; as if he were losing sight of the individuality of each person. The same fault has been found with Bishop Butler. In both philosophers it is only a way of speaking. For Aristotle teaches, that thought and affection move on parallel lines; that affirmation and negation correspond to desire and aversion; that truth and error are analogous to right conduct and wrong.² The distinction is one, which carefully analysed, leads back to a truth, which lies at the very foundation of psychology. It has been well said,

¹ “Ethics,” VI. xiii. There may be naturally a preponderance of either element. Women, for example, are, as a rule, less swayed by abstract considerations. With men, as a rule, a dry statement of facts is more convincing than appeals to the imagination. Imagination and fancy are the syntheses of intellect and emotion. When the intellectual element prevails, we call it fancy; when there is more of feeling and less of ingenuity, we call it imagination.

² “Ethics,” VI. i. and ii. To express the concurrence of the reason and the affections he speaks of “emotions of a reasonable kind” and “reasoning of an emotional kind” indifferently. Sympathy is the substructure of knowledge.

that "disjunction is the primordial form of all reasoning."¹ The starting-point of consciousness is that perception of the difference between self and non-self, from which are evolved all the manifold and complex harmonies of thought and desire.

The first dawn of a distinct consciousness is to be aware, that surrounding objects are a something external to self; then experience teaches, how to marshal them aright by the law of association or identity in their several ranks and companies, and how to conjecture, tentatively and hypothetically, by the same law, that so far as things are identical, so far their concomitants will be found to be the same. The essential unity of the person underlies at every stage the operations of the intellect and the parallel process of attraction or repulsion, which is for ever going on in the emotions. The reason and the emotions are co-operants, not independent factors, in producing conduct. Reason propounds the practical problem; emotion propels to or from the thing proposed. All reasoning is the outgrowth of the rudimentary sensation, "This is myself; this is not." All emotion is the outgrowth of the rudimentary sensation, "This I like; this I dislike." No one who observes, how plainly Aristotle enforces personal responsibility for conduct will say, that he inculcates "the old, dreary dualism."²

¹ WESTMINSTER REVIEW, LX. 357.

² "Our passions do not live apart in locked chambers, but, dressed in their small wardrobe of notions, bring their provisions to a common table and mess together, feeding out of the

The conception of the intellectual and emotional functions apart from one another no more involves forgetfulness of the unity of the individual, than to speak or think of the senses or of the limbs separately. To say, that a man is a microcosm, or even that he contains many microcosms, does not mean, that he is not one person. If physical science speaks of "colourless corpuscles in the blood, little masses of protoplasm—each enveloping a central nucleus, like an amœba,"¹ similarly psychology may regard the individual as having senses, intellect, affections, all subject to one conscious will, absorbing them into itself, and identifying itself with them.

Terminology.—In delineating the combined operations of intellect and passion Aristotle may seem at times to contradict himself, and the nomenclature, which he employs, may not be always strictly consistent. But the general drift is clear for practical purposes.

Metaphysically he speaks of a capability, formless and motionless, till it becomes an actual force producing an actual result, and of a vague potentiality, whence are to be educed order and symmetry.² Ethically he leads us, step by step, from wishing to deliberating, and thence to the final, irrevocable choice,³ or starting afresh from this act of choosing, common store according to their appetite."—GEORGE ELIOT, "Middlemarch," Bk. ii. pp. 298-9.

¹ HARVEY GOODWIN, "Science and Faith," p. 19.

² Δύναμις, ἐνέργεια, ἔργον.

³ Βούλησις, βούλευσις, προαίρεσις. Usually with Aristotle, προαίρεσις is about the end immediately in view, βούλευσις

for, though final on each occasion, it renews itself continually, as fresh occasions arise, he tells us, that the practical effort of choosing forms by degrees a habit, the outgrowth of which is at last an acquired disposition;¹ or, by a slight variation of his phraseology, he speaks of a capacity, as yet dormant for good or for evil, developing itself, if the desires are rightly disciplined by the intellect, into a permanent condition of well-doing and well-being.² But the discrepancies are more apparent than real. For this permanent and persistent excellence, the aim and goal of all, which precedes it, is itself by its very nature reproductive of the same energies, from which it has its being. The virtuous conduct is at once the antecedent and the consequent of the virtuous character. Nor is this to argue in a circle. For the intention,³ which alone stamps actions good or evil, is latent and implicit, or, at most, only operative in part, until the opportunity expresses and consummates it in action, even as in the laboratory of the chemist

about the way to it. In one place ("Ethics," III. iii.) βούλευσις is described as occupied about what is done through our own agency and is not invariable, while προαίρεσις occupies itself about the things, which lead to the end. Here the end appears to be, what Aristotle regards as the ultimate object of all human endeavour, happiness: consequently here the consultation and decision are, whether or not a particular course of action conduces to this end.

¹ ἔθος, ἡθος.

² Δύναμις, ἕξις, ἀρετή. The second of these terms, sometimes rendered "habit," *e.g.*, by Professor FERRIER ("Lectures on Greek Philosophy," I. 392), is, rather, the result of habit.

³ Προαίρεσις.

the hypothesis remains not unverified only, but, as it were, a mere embryo of the form, which it shall assume, till it is plunged into the crucible of experiment. The vague, almost unconscious craving is shaped and matured, for better or for worse, by conflict with actual realities.¹

Virtue a Science?—Can moral excellence be learned by the cultivation of the intellect? Is to know what is right the same thing as to practise it? Is knowledge synonymous with goodness? To questions such as these Aristotle gives only a qualified assent. He places, indeed, the purely intellectual life,² undisturbed in the serenity of its contemplation by the strife and tumult of passions, far above the grandest triumphs of moral excellence; and even in the winning of those moral triumphs, which must be won, before that higher life can be enjoyed, it is to the intellect, as we have seen already, that he assigns the palm. But he recognises truly, that there is something in human nature, which chafes and rebels against the reason,³ and that there is an infirmity, whether from temperament or from habit, which can paralyse the will, even when a man sees clearly enough, what he ought to do. Thus he is careful to distinguish those, in whom reason, whether victorious in the end or not, contends for mastery with the passions, from those, on the one hand, who are un-

¹ Cf. "When lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin."—St. James i. 15.

² *Θεωρία*.

³ "Ethics," I. xiii. 15; VII. x. 4. Cf. Romans vii. 19-24.

swerving in their allegiance to virtue, the passions having been reduced to obedience, and from those, on the other hand, who have fallen so low as to struggle no more. Those who cannot govern themselves, in whom reason is too feeble to assert her authority, are wise, he says, only so far as knowing goes, not wise practically; or rather, their wisdom is a mere cleverness, which may be as powerful for evil as for good¹ (pp. 14, 37).

What is sometimes translated "moral thought"² occupies a different place in the philosophies of Aristotle and Plato, the former making intellectual rectitude, though an indispensable condition of moral excellence, not identical with it. This practical insight, he tells us, can only dictate, what steps are to be taken in order to arrive at the end; but to decide the previous question, what is the end to be arrived at, something else is requisite, the moral excellence, which comes, when the affections are trained habitually to be obedient to reason.³

¹ "Ethics," VII. x. 2. Cf. St. Luke xii. 48.

² "Thought" is inadequate for *φρόνησις*; especially as "thought" resides in the other categories (*νοῦς, σοφία, τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη*) mentioned in juxtaposition with *φρόνησις* ("Ethics," VI. iii.-vii.). The "wisdom" which occurs frequently in the English version of the Bible is nearer to *φρόνησις*.

³ "Ethics," VI, xiii.

CHAPTER II.

FREEWILL.

~~Aristotle assumes it.~~—On the question, which lies at the root of all ethical philosophy and of all practical distinctions between right and wrong in morals, Aristotle implies more, than he asserts explicitly. The question whether or not man is a free agent, or how far and under what limitations man is free, was not really before him. Some seven centuries later the civilised world in Europe discussed eagerly man's freewill in relation to God's omnipotence. In more modern times man's freewill is discussed in relation to a materialistic necessity. It is the same problem stated differently. In both cases it is by a full and free recognition of each phase of the fact, not by attempting to pare them down to the exigencies of a finite understanding, that the practical truth is attained.¹ It was enough for Aristotle to take the freedom of the will for granted;² and had he entered the arena at all in this quarrel it would have been for

¹ Thus St. Paul never shrinks from expressing, on the one hand, the absolute foreknowledge of God and, on the other, the absolute responsibility of man in their strongest terms, without trying to reconcile fate and freewill in their apparently internecine conflict.

² "Ethics," III. i. Cf. GRANT, "Ethics," I. 285.

him a question of metaphysics rather than of ethics. Writing on ethics he was content to take things as he found them; and probably his reply to a sceptic about freewill would have been, like Dr. Johnson's retort to an idealist questioning the existence of a stone, that the sceptic should try for himself. Freewill is a postulate, a practical assumption, which he starts with. It is implied in the appeal, which he makes constantly to praise and blame to determine the goodness or badness of an action, for, though praise or blame of a certain kind may be awarded to a piece of machinery, it is the intention of the agent, which, with him, determines the quality of the action, and consequently, with him, it is to the intention, that praise or blame is due.¹ It is implied in the distinction, which, as we have seen, he insists upon emphatically, between right-wishing and right-willing and between right-knowing and right-doing, and in his graphic portraiture of those, who can admire, what is best and yet practise what is worst, because their baser propensities are not firmly repressed by their reason. It is implied in what he says² of the impossibility in ethics of doing more,

¹ Thus Aristotle distinguishes doing just things from being just, the action considered by itself and estimated only by external circumstances from the intelligent and deliberate intention, the habitual moral condition of the agent,—*e.g.*, "Ethics," II. iv. 5; V. vii. viii. ix.; VI. xii. 7. Cf. 1 Cor. xiii. 3. Similarly the Epistle to the Romans contrasts a formal observance of law, with a willing surrender of self to God.

² "Ethics," II. ii. 3, 4.

than trace an outline without attempting to fill in the particulars. It pervades the ethics from beginning to end. If he speaks, in passages, of nature, necessity,¹ chance as the causes at work, elsewhere he adds reason and all, that comes from man. (44) (5)

Man's capability for Good or Evil.—Aristotle regards human nature as an undetermined capability for virtue or vice, until it receives a bias in the one direction or the other, by training from without and by the higher element asserting its supremacy within. This capability he sees everywhere in nature, in things inanimate as in man, but he marks the difference. The capability of heat, for example, he tells us, speaking not as a physicist but as a metaphysician, must result, if developed into actuality, in heat by an inherent and invariable law. But human nature is to him, as the raw material, which may be worked up into what is beautiful or what is hideous, as the quarry, from which is to be chiselled an Apollo or a Satyr.² So far as what seems praiseworthy in a man is merely a gift of nature, an inherited aptitude, or so far as it is merely the capricious play of the emotions or the ineffective and inoperative theorising of the intellect, it is not, for him, virtue, but only, when matured into a normal and habitual principle of conduct, intelligently adopted, and after due deliberation.³ The passions are to him as neutral in

¹ Aristotle generally regards necessity from a subjective standpoint, and uses the word as equivalent to "certainty."

² Appendix C.

³ "Ethics," II. v.

tint as the appetites, until they are coloured for good or evil by the discipline of life. Even in the intellect, which he exalts so highly, all that nature gives is a cleverness, which, he says, may degenerate into cunning, if it is not duly cultured into wisdom, and may thus enhance the mischief done, as a huge mass falls with a heavier crash.¹ At every step of the process, as desire ripens into deed, from the fantasy to the wish, from the wish to the volition, he sees a growing capacity for virtue or vice, [accomplishing itself in the actual. His successors in the Peripatetic school taught less equivocally than their teacher, that this energising actuality, which he had been so careful to separate in conception from mere capability, involves self-determination in the agent.² But the distinction itself, in his way of enforcing it, implies, that there is something in man as well as in his environment, which shapes the formation of his character ;³ that, come what may, he is master of himself ; that the inalienable freedom of his will shows itself in grappling with temptations ; that evil, after all, is for eventual good, as eliciting and developing the latent strength in man to "overcome evil with good."

Habit.—Aristotle lays great stress on habituation as the most important factor in the formation of character. He regards moral excellence as far more

¹ "Ethics," VI. xiii. Cf. "Vis consill expers Mole ruit sua."

² Cf. GRANT, "Ethics," I. 37.

³ "A man's action is the joint result of circumstances and character."—GREEN, "Prolegomena," &c., p. 109.

dependent on habit than on nature or even on the instruction imparted by others.¹ He takes the law of habit for granted, as a law of human nature so plainly self-evident as to require no proof, no argument.² As all natural endowments must be brought to perfection by constant practice, as the eye of the sculptor, the ear of the musician must be trained by constant exercise, so must they, who would be virtuous, practise virtue continually. Whether the action shall be done well or badly, and whether the general conduct shall be regulated rightly or amiss (and it is the adverb, not the verb, which always characterises), turns most of all on daily, hourly habituation. On the surface habit wears the appearance of being merely mechanical. It looks like the routine of clockwork, which once set going persists methodically in its monotonous beats and pauses. It may even seem to a hasty glance to preclude free-will. But a closer inspection shows, that, so far as concerns human conduct, this invariability is more apparent than real, and that there is a disturbing force, which can derange the nicely-calculated movements. With nearly the same conditions existing very frequently within and without, there would be less variability than there is, but for the will. There are inconsistencies and irregularities,³ not only in persons closely similar in disposition and in circum-

¹ Cf. "Fortes creantur fortibus et bonis; doctrina sed vim promovet insitam, Rectique cultus pectora roborat."

² Cf. GRANT, "Ethics," I. 240.

³ Cf. H. SPENCER, "Study of Sociology," p. 367.

stances, but in one and the same person, which defy the anticipations founded on law and precedent, and which can only be accounted for by something in man stronger even than the almost irresistible force of habit. There would, doubtless, be even less of apparent uniformity of conduct than there is, were it not, that too many follow one another, like sheep, instead of realising their personal freedom and personal responsibility. Will, with all its arbitrary changefulness, may indeed be subject to laws as unvarying as those, which govern a chess-board. But, so long as these laws lie beyond his cognisance, man is practically free.

Aristotle saw all this clearly. In the studio of the artist, he tells us, the work is distinct from the workman; in the formation of character the workman is himself the work.¹ Even in the domain of art the artist is helped or hindered in his future endeavours by what he has done already.² But in that, which is the work of life, the thing done is a more integral part of the man, more inseparable from him. He is making or marring himself. He is imperceptibly weaving a closely-fitting garment for his limbs, which must embarrass or expedite their efforts. The chains, which he forges for himself, are, it is well said, too slight to be felt, till they are almost too strong to be broken. Each vicious action is a link, which

¹ "Ethics," II. iv.

² Contrast AUGUSTINE, "De Civitate Dei," XI. xxi., on the divine skill not being improvable by its operations, because already perfect.

makes the lengthening chain more cumbrous, more inextricable. Every moral disposition, good or evil, gains strength by continuance,¹ and, in proportion, the quickness of conscience is deadened, the elasticity of the will is weakened. All this restricting influence of habit, leaving a man at every step more predisposed either to good or to evil, Aristotle admits freely. He sees, that a man's actions are, indeed, his offspring, and are, in turn, progenitors of a long line of children's children, reacting on the man himself. He grants, that each step in the wrong direction makes it increasingly difficult to retrace the steps; just as he grants, that some are by nature better equipped than others² for going right. But the force of habit is with Aristotle no excuse for vice. The man is responsible for his habits, for he is free to choose, before he commits himself to action; he must decide for himself, whether this or that course, presented to him by the imagination,³ is really to be preferred. Habit, with Aristotle, far from being an excuse for vice, intensifies the responsibility of every action, of every intention. The incapacity for discerning and for doing what is right,⁴ the vitiated taste, the perverted judgment, the enfeebled will, Aristotle traces back to the culpable remissness, which allowed the vicious habit to become so strong.⁵

¹ Cf. "Crescit indulgens sibi dirus hydrops." The power of habit is analogous to the law of association, which governs the intellect.

² Cf. St. Matt. xxv. 15.

³ "Ethics," III. v. 17-21.

⁴ Cf. St. Matt. vi. 23.

⁵ In saying, that the will makes the habit and the habit makes

The deliberate Choice.—The keystone of the arch in the ethical system of Aristotle is the determination made at the moment, when deliberation is over and action must begin.¹ Till then the affections are importuning, the reason is advising; then the final plunge is taken, the man resolves, decides, acts. If the action is to be pronounced virtuous, in the fullest sense, the agent must act knowingly, from a deliberate preference for what is right for its own sake, from an habitual conviction.² All this implies freewill.³ The apparent discrepancy between the Eudemian explanation of the word expressive of this decisive choice and the explanation of it in the earlier books is scarcely more than verbal.⁴ When Eudemus says, that it concerns itself about the end in view as well as about the means, he speaks of the immediate end, as wealth, enjoyment, renown. When Aristotle limits the word to the choice of means only, he merely excludes that, which he considers, by universal consent, the object of all human endeavours, the good thing,

the will, Aristotle is not really arguing in a circle. The will initiates, the habit intensifies. There is, as always, action with reaction.

¹ "Ethics," III. iii. 19.

² "Ethics," II. iv. 3.

³ "Ethics," III. ii. 5. Elsewhere (X. v. 4) Aristotle speaks of one pleasure thrusting out another. The former passage shows that one inducement does not prevail over another mechanically and by sheer weight, without the will intervening.

⁴ In "Ethics," VII. x. 3, the word *προαίρεσις* is used inexactly. Here it must, by the context, mean, as Grant has remarked, a "general intention"; just as one acting wrongly may be said "to mean well."

which every one must desire, the happiness, which all seek, however widely they may disagree as to the way of seeking, and which therefore lies for him outside the pale of deliberation and decision.¹ Throughout the treatise man is regarded as responsible (if not always altogether, yet, at the least, so far as nature and circumstances have not prejudiced his choice)² for choosing the true happiness, as well as for choosing, on each several occasion, the true way to attain it.

What has been called "the practical syllogism" illustrates the independency of the will, however much the will may be swayed by the logic of the intellect and by the promptings of the affections. No one would contend, that the syllogism is worked out consciously in all its minuteness, whenever a man has to decide; for this goes on continuously. The process may be, and usually is, so rapid as to be instantaneous. Happiness, in whatever sense understood, is with Aristotle, the subject of the major premiss; the conclusion would follow inevitably, if men were always obedient to the dictates of reason.³ But the liberty of choice intervenes at every step. The man decides for himself, what shall be the object, which he will propose to himself for attainment, and,

¹ Cf. note 3 on pp. 7, 8.

² Cf. "How oft the sight of means to do ill deeds
Makes ill deeds done."

SHAKESPEARE, "King John," IV. 2.

³ Happiness is to be preferred to other considerations; this conduct is happiness; therefore this conduct is to be preferred.

whether the particular action is conducive to that end or not; and, even when he has assented to the propositions before him, he may still demur to carry out his reasonings to their legitimate conclusion.¹ For example, he may place duty or pleasure as the end in view; he may select this or that course of action as leading to this end; and, when all this is done, he may refuse to ratify his own verdict, choosing to be inconsistent with himself. Esau² might have put aside the conception of pleasure presented to his imagination by the pottage, which he longed for, if he had willed to set before himself duty as the thing to be aimed at; or, while proposing pleasure as his end, he might have accepted the birthright, not the pottage, as the way to it; or, at the last moment he might have shaken himself free of the propositions, which he had assented to intellectually. A man drawn to a ginshop or a gaming-table by his craving for drink or for gambling, drawn to his home by the thought of wife and children, is free, till he has passed the doorstep, to choose, into which of the scales he will throw his own weight, the preference of his will. If the action of his will, it has been said, were governed by purely physical causes, the upshot of the conflict of these contradictory syllogisms within him would be, that he would make his way neither to the ginshop nor to his home but to a spot between the two. A

¹ *E.g.*, "Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor."

² Cf. GREEN, "Prolegomena to the Ethics," p. 99.

physical combination of opposing forces would not result in the utter destruction of the weaker of the two.¹

Aristotle's teaching about courage corroborates what has been said, that this deliberate intention is everything with him for praise or for blame. He will not allow, that insensibility to danger, whether from natural temperament or from experience (or, it might be added, from the rashness of ignorance) is courage in the true sense of the word.² A soldier, he says, may seem brave, when he is only callous to the sense of danger. The truly brave are those, who see and appreciate the peril, and yet overcome their fear.³ The natural emotion of fear, like other emotions, is in itself neither right nor wrong. Courage and cowardice consist in the choice made between an inglorious self-preservation and an honourable exposure of self to danger. Perhaps Aristotle errs in saying,⁴ that to abstain from things pleasant is easier than to endure pain. Probably much depends on the idiosyncrasy of the person. But in principle he is right. In enduring pain as in refraining from pleasure it is the will (Aristotle would say, the higher reason) which ratifies or cancels the logic of the understanding and the persuasive solicitations of the emotional elements in our being.

Actions involuntary wholly or in part.—Aristotle

¹ Appendix D.

² "Ethics," III. 6-8.

³ Cf. "The brave man is not he, who feels no fear, For that were stupid and irrational."

⁴ "Ethics," III. ix. 2, ἐγκρατής, κατρεπός. Cf. p. 42.

enters with characteristic exactitude on the subtle inquiry,¹ more properly belonging to casuistry, but intimately connected with the great question of free-will, how far any one can truly be said to act voluntarily, if he is acting under protest, reluctantly and with an assent, which is only half-hearted at most. He brings, as usual, a judicial acuteness to bear on these apparently dubious cases. Where physical constraint is exercised, there, he says, is no free agency; if the fingers are compelled by physical pressure to sign a document, neither the act nor the agent is free. Where intimidation is used, or a bribe, or cajolery, there, whatever deduction may be made for the influence at work, the act and the agent are free. This distinction he extends to those cases, where the pressure of the inducement is from within, in the shape of pleasure, or of profit, or of reputation, or of what is right for its own sake. These inducements, he says, however potent and attractive, cannot compel. If they could, no action would be free.² Besides, he argues, the doer has pleasure in what he is doing, while, on the contrary, in actions really compulsory, there is a preponderance of pain. He rends asunder the sophistry, which would excuse crimes committed under the influence of lust or anger or any other evil passion, on the plea, that the criminal could not help it, replying, that, be the inducement ever so great, the

¹ "Ethics," III. i.

² "Ethics," III. i. He instances the captain of a ship throwing overboard the cargo in a storm.

real origination of the act is in the man's consent to it.¹ It is a man's own fault, due allowance being made, as always, for the bias of natural dispositions and of circumstances, that he is so easily caught by the bait² dangled before him. If he knows, what he is about, or if he wilfully refuses to know, or if his inability to know is due to the demoralising influence of vicious habits, the offender is responsible. The drunkard may be as unconscious as a man walking in his sleep, but he has brought himself by his own doing into this unconsciousness; and therefore a crime committed in this state of unconsciousness, being the consequence of a responsible act, is itself indirectly the act of a responsible being.³ The tests, with Aristotle, of voluntariness and responsibility are very practical. Is the actor aware, what he is doing? Is he unconstrained by physical force? In

¹ "Ethics," III. i. 6, 12; III. v. 6, 21, 22.

² "Ethics," III. i. 11. *Εὐθιήρατος*.

³ He, who errs because of ignorance involuntarily, and for which he is not responsible (*δι' ἄγνοιαν*), knows right from wrong (*τὸ καθόλου*), but mistakes the circumstances (*τὰ καθέκαστα*); he acts against his intention (*ἄκων*) or, at least, without intention (*οὐκ ἐκόν*). He who errs in inexcusable ignorance (*ἀγνοῶν*) knows not, at least for the time, right from wrong, the blindness being in his intention ("Ethics," III. i.). In the New Testament *κατ' ἄνους* is used of culpable ignorance in Acts iii. 17. The thoroughly depraved, according to Aristotle, lose the faculty of discerning good from evil ("Ethics," III. i. 14. Cf. St. Matt. vi. 23). The graduated scale of responsibility in the "Ethics" (V. viii. 3) resembles roughly the distinctions in English law relating to murder.

other words, does the act trace back its real origin to something within the man or without ?¹

It had been argued,² that none are willingly wicked, none happy against their will. Aristotle admits, that all wish to be happy, and that, consequently, in a normal state none can wish to be wicked. But he insists on the fact, that, while wishing for happiness, it is possible to choose the path, which leads away from it; and that, without deliberately wishing to be wicked, any one may become so by consenting to what is wrong. This inconsistency, this irresolution, by which, in the collision of opposing principles within a man the worse prevails, Aristotle anatomises in his description of those, who cannot restrain their propensities. The man, who yields to his lower propensities,³ yields with a sigh, but he yields. The man, who overcomes them,⁴ overcomes not without a pang. In both the regret is mastered by a something, which converts it into a sense of satisfaction in the choice, and which indicates, that the action is not the mere outcome of material forces within the man, but springs from himself.

Freewill and Law.—Freewill, as regarded by

¹ "Ethics," III. i. v.s.

² "Οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν πονηρὸς οὐδ' ἀκὼν μάκαρ" is true in a sense. It is scarcely conceivable of any human being, that he wishes to be wicked for the sake of being wicked, but only for some ulterior good to himself, apparently resulting from the wickedness. It is inconceivable, that any human being can be happy against his will, for that would be misery. Yet happiness to self may come unsought and without being aimed at.

³ Ἀκρατής.

⁴ Ἐγκρατής.

Aristotle, is not incompatible with law ; for whether exercised rightly or wrongly, it obeys the laws, which pervade immaterial existence. As a miracle cannot be truly said to violate the laws of the universe, merely because man can neither explain nor control the laws, by which it works ; so the human will cannot be said to violate law, merely because, when it overrules the forces of intellect and of affection, man cannot define, cannot ponderate the conditions, which determine it. In both cases a living force displays itself in its effects, not in the secret of its being. In both cases that force may be in accord with law, though the law transcends man's power to decipher it.

It may be true, ideally and theoretically, that a science might be constructed from the study of social developments, which would enable the student to calculate beforehand, how the will would act in certain contingencies. But the diversities of character and of external circumstances are too intricate to encourage the hope, that such aspirations can ever be realised in this life. The requisite data are unattainable.¹ The fullest assertion of freewill does not really clash with the unvarying sequence of cause and effect,² though that sequence may baffle all attempts to trace it. Mutable and capricious as may seem the operations of the will, they are closely intertwined with

¹ Cf. H. SPENCER, "The Study of Sociology" (9th edit.), p. 55.

² Cf. GREEN, "Prolegomena," &c., p. 113.

those material elements of our nature, which subject themselves to the analysis of the physicist.¹ For all practical purposes, Aristotle gives his voice, in no faltering tones, for man's freedom of action, for man's responsibility. A philosophy which has learned, since his day, that sorrow for sin is no longer barren remorse² but the first step to amendment, that man is not left alone to struggle with his lower self, that new strength is given him for the future, and that even the guilty past can be effaced, as though it had never been, may look back thankfully on what Aristotle did in his day and according to his opportunities in asserting, that man is free.

¹ Cf. "Self is not something apart from feelings, desires, and thoughts. . . . The Ego identifies itself with some desire."—GREEN, "Prolegomena," &c., pp. 104, 106.

² *Μεταμελεία*. *Μετανοία* is not in the "Ethics."

CHAPTER III.

CONSCIENCE.

Conscience and Consciousness.—What has been said of Freewill in the "Ethics" is true of Conscience. Freewill, we have seen, is assumed as a postulate, if not as an axiom, the starting-point of the investigation, a truth underlying the argument from first to last; and, if there cannot be found a precise equivalent for the term, expressions occur, which come very near to it.¹ Similarly conscience is implied, if not expressed in formula. There is a twofold meaning in the word. It includes not only the knowledge of right and wrong, but the application of this knowledge to self, as a rule by which self is to be measured; it includes introspection or consciousness, as well as what is vaguely termed the "moral sense." In both senses conscience is implied by Aristotle. For the whole drift of his treatise takes for granted, that there is a solid distinction, whatever may be his principle of distinguishing, between right conduct and wrong; and the reflex or introspective consciousness² is implied, for instance,

¹ *E.g.*, ἐκὼν, ἀκροαίος.

² Consciousness is implied in Aristotle's idea of perfect energy.—GRANT, "Ethics," I. pp. 244, 245. Cf. AUGUSTINE "De Civitate Dei," XI. xxvii.

in the distinction on which he insists, between right knowledge and right practice, as well as in the self-reproaches and self-justification of those, who fail or who succeed in their efforts to control themselves.¹ There is not indeed the unhesitating and unequivocal enunciation of self-knowledge, self-acquittal, self-condemnation, which is the inheritance of Christian ethics.² The word, which the New Testament has made familiar for this moral introspection, is not in Aristotle.³ As we have seen, he makes the reason the judge, presiding over this court ever in session within the man, rather than the advocate, laying his case before the will, whose verdict is final.⁴ Above all, apart from any deficiencies in the character of the morality, which it inculcates, the great defect in the Aristotelian conception of conscience is the want of authority. Conscience, with Aristotle, is not the voice of God. So long as conscience is supported by no sanction higher, than man himself can give, so long as conscience can appeal only to the general consent of mankind, to the intelligent approval of those, who are esteemed above their fellows, to the legislative

¹ *E.g.*, "Ethics," IX. iv. 5, 10.

² *Cf.* "Self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control."

TENNYSON.

And

"In unpretending holiness of soul
Can still suspect and still revere himself."

WORDSWORTH.

³ *Συνείδησις*.

⁴ *E.g.*, "Ethics," IX. iv. 4. *Cf.* FERRIER, "Lectures on Greek Philosophy," p. 382. (See Appendix E.)

enactments of the State, to considerations, however obvious, of expediency, conscience cannot dictate, can only expostulate and remonstrate, often, like Cassandra, in vain. Without a sanction more permanent, more comprehensive, more unquestionably obligatory than human enforcements, singly or collectively, can supply, conscience cannot claim obedience as a due, which must be rendered, come what may.¹

The Use of Δεῖ.—Some have argued from the word,² which is the Greek equivalent for obligation, and which occurs frequently in the "Ethics," as if it implied a tacit recognition of conscience. But a careful collation of the passages in question disproves this, and shows, that the word is used invariably in a secondary or subsidiary sense, merely as implying, that something is indispensable for the end in view, whatever the end may be. For example, any one, who would be a good recipient of ethical instruction, must previously be trained in good habits.³ The politician must be a psychologist.⁴ We must not even wish for what is wrong, if we would be virtuous.⁵ Even in passages, where at first sight the word seems, as if it meant a rule or principle acknowledged by conscience, a closer inspection shows, as before, that the word

¹ *E.g.*, "Ethics," IV. vii. viii. ix., where, about boasting, jesting, &c., the standard of propriety is merely conventional.

² Δεῖ, with Aristotle, means a want to be supplied rather than a debt to be discharged.

³ "Ethics," I. iv. 6; II. iii. 2.

⁴ "Ethics," I. xiii. 7.

⁵ "Ethics," V. i. 9.

refers to some particular purpose. The really brave man must be, for the purpose of the definition, one, who is brave not by the force of necessity;¹ the glutton is one, who eats more than he ought, if he would be well in health.² Those, who attain the summit of moral perfection according to Aristotle, desire as they ought; that is, as they must, if they wish to attain perfect self-control.³ In the same sense those, who become hopelessly vicious, according to Aristotle, desire, as they ought not;⁴ and those, who mean well but are feeble in self-control, do not what they think, that they ought to do.⁵ The magnanimous man must be a good man, that is, if he is to be worthy to be called magnanimous; he must be only so far ambitious, as he ought to be, or, as Aristotle himself explains his phrase, only so far as is generally commended.⁶ Clearly, it would be unfair to argue from so contracted a use of the word, that it represents conscience, as the acknowledgment of a debt to be paid to a person other than self.

Origin of Conscience.—What is termed the genesis of conscience, in other words, the origin, growth, formation of conscience, is a question, which has exercised philosophy ever since the great revival of thought in Europe during the sixteenth century. On the one side are those, who maintain, that conscience is a primary and integral fact in human nature, coeval with the origin of man. On the other side are

¹ "Ethics," III. viii. 5; ix. 1.

² "Ethics," III. xi. 8.

³ "Ethics," III. x. 3, 4.

⁴ "Ethics," III. xi. 4.

⁵ "Ethics," V. ix. 6.

⁶ "Ethics," IV. iii. 8, 10.

those, who would resolve conscience into elements more or less inconsistent with the conception of conscience as the restraining sense of duty, into mere cravings of appetite, or into calculations of what will bring profit or pleasure to the individual himself or to society at large. To avoid ambiguity the distinction must be kept in mind between the two ideas contained in the term, self-consciousness and the perception of a difference between right and wrong.¹ Self-consciousness, it has been said,² by a singularly thoughtful and unbiassed student of moral philosophy, cannot be the outcome of a merely material organism. The spirit in man,³ which is his very self, is, in itself, independent of the development of its environment, though not unaffected by modifications arising from progress of a material kind. So far as the perception of the difference between right and wrong is cultivated by experience, the reflex action of consciousness in this direction is developed proportionately. The germ-conscience, the dim sense of duty in the child, the savage, the dog, or the horse, is to the enlightened conscience of the saint or the philosopher as the faint streak, which heralds the sunrise is to the matured brightness of noonday. This growth of conscience is exemplified alike in the life of the individual and in the collective history of mankind,

¹ Cf. p. 27.

² "Self-consciousness is not a merely natural event."—GREEN,

"Prolegomena," &c., p. 99. Cf. p. 117.

³ Cf. 1 Cor. ii. 11.

unless it is thwarted and checked by adverse circumstances.

The sense of duty, though having its origin in the constituent elements of man's being, needs to be fostered and strengthened by appliances from without; and as it attains maturity, it learns to dispense with these supports and reverts more and more to unconstrained and instantaneous operations.¹ Revelation has enforced and expanded the rudimentary dictates of conscience, slowly and painfully training mankind for the full revelation of perfect goodness in the Incarnate God. Human thought ascends from the elementary principles of unselfishness, to God above, and thence descends to earth in the person of Christ Jesus.

Indeed, the question, whether conscience can or cannot be traced back to an origin apparently alien to the high position, which it claims for itself in the civilised world, is, like all questions about evolution, of very slight importance practically. Conscience is, what it is. If conscience has its parentage in sympathetic or "altruistic" instincts, there is nothing here incompatible with the belief, that these impulses of sympathy

¹ Cf. "There are, who ask not if thine eye
Be on them, who, in loving truth
Where no misgiving is, rely
Upon the genial sense of youth."

WORDSWORTH.

"The sense of duty will diminish, as fast as moralisation increases."—H. SPENCER, "Data of Ethics," p. 127. In other words, "Perfect love casteth out fear" (1 St. John iv. 18).

have been strengthened and purified by a providential discipline.¹ Even if the descent of conscience could be demonstrated from ancestry so unlike itself as the greediness of a mere animal selfishness, the fact would still remain, that under the shapings of a guiding hand, conscience has become, what it is. Nor is this a question, to the solution of which Aristotle contributes largely, except as favoring the opinion, that conscience is developed by civilisation.² He is content, as usual, to appeal to the fact, that those, who are accounted most trustworthy,³ praise or blame this or that principle of conduct. Their verdict is enough for him. Their consent is all that he requires, to explain, not how conscience comes to be, what he finds it, but how it takes its part in regulating the affairs of men.

Variations in the Moral Code.—But an objection presents itself, based on the discrepancies as to what things are culpable or praiseworthy in different parts of the world, and on the still more startling anomaly, that certain individuals and certain tribes appear to have no sense at all of there being any difference between vice and virtue.⁴ Against all

¹ "The real morality of the Bible is its final morality, the morality in the intention of the lawgiver from the beginning. . . . In its very *evolution* we have a sign of the supernatural life in the religion of Israel. There is the continuity of a divine purpose here."—"New Analogy" (Macmillan & Co.).

² Cf. GRANT, "Ethics," &c., I. 381.

³ Οἱ ἰκανῶς παιδευμένοι.

⁴ TYLOR, "Primitive Culture," II. p. 318. Cf. St. Matt. xiii. 28, 39.

objections of this kind Aristotle would reply, and it is a reply well worthy of consideration, that the final court of appeal, on questions of morality, is to the cultivated intelligence of the nations, and of the individuals, which stand foremost in civilisation. Whatever jars with this, he puts aside as exceptional and unhealthy. Even if there were a numerical preponderance of votes against it, he would abide by this. The fact, that some savage tribes have no love for their offspring, or that others prefer a nephew to a son, no more disproves the axiomatic rule, that parents love their children, than the fact, that a savage does not accept the axioms of mathematics, till he has been taught, disproves the practical universality of these axioms. It may be retorted, that even in highly-civilised communities there is occasionally a glaring divergence¹ from the received code. But this is only tantamount to saying, that the refinements of culture in Athens, Rome, Paris, London, are no safeguard, by themselves, against immorality. There is, after all, a strong consent on the part of those, who prove their title to speak by their superiority otherwise, on what may be termed the axioms of morality, truth, justice, temperance, purity, courage, kindness; and history shows, as a fact, whether, when they are brought face to face, the higher or lower morality wins the day.

The "Tribal Self."—Aristotle has something to

¹ E.g., "Voltaire was a terrible liar, but not a bad fellow after all."—*Nineteenth Century*, Oct. 1882.

say on another point, which commends itself, to the philosophy of the present day. Some would explain conscience by a theory, which merges the existence of the individual in a "tribal self," or in what is called "social tissue," as if the life social could be studied apart from the life of the atoms, which constitute society, and as if what is more simple and more obvious could be understood better in the complex whole, of which it is a part, than in itself.¹ Aristotle is not without a certain sympathy for ideas like these. He regards man as essentially a political creature.² It is, with him, as part of a social organism, that man exercises most adequately his noblest energies. The community, with him, overshadows, and dwarfs the individual. But to demonstrate, that virtue conduces to the well-being of the State is not to demonstrate that virtue has no being of her own irrespective of results. To prove, that honesty is the best policy, is not the same thing as to prove, that honesty is mere expediency. In maintaining, that virtue can find full scope only in the mutual relations of society, Aristotle is not maintaining, that virtue is only a name to express the net result of the balance-sheet of profit and loss to the community.

"Judicet Orbis."—In appealing to the verdict of those who are entitled to the greatest deference, Aristotle appeals to the most enlightened communities as well as to the individuals who are foremost there. For

¹ Cf. H. SPENCER, "Study of Sociology," p. 326.

² "Ethics," I. vii. 6.

from first to last he regards man as reaching his full stature, practically, in his social relations; and his ideal man, from this point of view, represents the community. This consummate judge of moral rectitude, from whose sentence Aristotle admits of no appeal, he describes in various ways. He is the man in earnest,¹ as distinct from the triflers, who drift listlessly and helplessly down the stream. He is the thoughtful² man, who sees things as they are, grasping their true meaning, regulating himself by reason. He is the man trained thoroughly,³ and equipped on all sides for the conflict.⁴ In the two phrases, which stand first, we have, severally, the emotions and the intellect at their best for practical purposes. For this earnestness means, that the affections are not dissipated and wasted, but concentrated on the right objects; this thoughtfulness means, that the judgment sees clearly, what these objects are. In the last phrase we have the external discipline, without which the faculties are stunted and misshapen. Aristotle speaks of a perceptiveness, which wears the appearance of intuition in its instantaneous grasp of moral fitness,⁵ or, as he would express it, of the mean between the two extremes,⁶ in every crisis. But the tenor of his psychology teaches, that every faculty lies dormant, as though it were not, till wakened by

¹ "Ethics," III. iv. 4, σπουδαῖος.

² "Ethics," II. vi. 15, φρόνιμος.

³ "Ethics," I. iii. 4, πεπαιδευμένος. Cf. Appendix F.

⁴ "Ethics," I. x. 15, κεχορηγημένος.

⁵ GRANT, "Ethics," &c., I. 256, 377.

⁶ "Ethics," II. vi. 15.

the touch of its surroundings, and grows only by experience. With intellect and emotions thus made perfect the thoughtful student of life discerns the true purport of life,¹ regarded as a whole, as well as what he must do and be² on each particular occasion,³ if he would attain to this felicity, being himself the rule and measure of these things.⁴

Φρόνησις.—The word,⁵ sometimes translated "prudence," more properly "moral thoughtfulness," used by Aristotle to denote the mature faculty of judging rightly in questions of morality, has, with him, the reflex and introspective action of consciousness, and is, perhaps, the nearest approach, in his terminology, to conscience. It pronounces, what is good, not in the abstract merely but for oneself,⁶ and it enjoins, what must be done with a view to this end.⁷ Thus he distinguishes it from that apprehension of what is right generally,⁸ which can co-exist with moral depravity,⁹ and which may degenerate into mere cleverness,¹⁰ more mischievous¹¹ than unintelligent vice. In art, he says, those, who err from not knowing better, are most to be blamed; in conduct the knowledge

¹ "Ethics," III. iv. 4.

² "Ethics," VI. vii. 6, 7.

³ *Φρόνησις*.

⁴ "Ethics," VI. x. 2.

⁵ A vicious man, Aristotle says, can repeat fine phrases about virtue ("Ethics," VII. iii. 8).

⁶ *Παρουργία*. Cf. St. Luke xii. 47; St. James i. 22. Cf. "Cunning is not dishonest wisdom, which would be a contradiction in terms; it is dishonest prudence." CARLYLE, "Life of Sterling," p. 171.

⁷ *Εὐπραξία*.

⁸ "Ethics," III. iv. 5.

⁹ "Ethics," VI. v. 5.

¹⁰ *Σύνεσις*.

¹¹ *Δεινότης*.

of what is right aggravates the offence.¹ He is never weary of reiterating, that a vicious life dims the intellectual insight into the beautiful and the expedient; the insolence of rebellious passions disturbs the serene equilibrium, which the life contemplative enjoys, and renders, what should be certain, unstable and precarious.²

Ἐγκρασία.—Nowhere, perhaps, in his philosophy does Aristotle assert more implicitly the existence of what in his system is analogous to conscience than in his graphic delineation of the struggle between right and wrong in those, who have neither fallen so low, nor soared so high as to be exempt from it.³ According to the Hindu proverb, only the supremely wise and the utterly foolish are happy in this world, because they only stand outside this arena of deadly and incessant strife. Aristotle would include few in these categories. There is, he says, something in our nature different from reason, contrary to it, contending with it;⁴ the desires. This refractory element in our being is not, like the vegetative,⁵ insensible to the voice of reason, for, unless it gains the upper hand, it is amenable to reproof and exhortation.⁶ But those, who allow themselves to be its slaves, are paralysed and spell-bound; they cannot hear, cannot understand, what

¹ "Ethics," VI. v.

² "Ethics," VI. v. Cf. "Faults in the life breed errors in the brain."—COWPER.

³ Ἀκόλαστοι, σῶφρονες.

⁴ "Ethics," I. xiii. 15; III. xii. 7; VII. iii. 11.

⁵ I. xiii. 11.

⁶ I. xiii. 15.

reason is saying.¹ The passions therefore must be regulated by reason ; they must not put themselves in opposition to it ; they must be in perfect harmony with it, speaking in the same tones, breathing the same spirit. While making allowance for their vehemence, as an extenuation of the wrong-doing, Aristotle does not allow that the wrong-doer is justified thereby. He argues, that those, who err deliberately without the provocation of strong passions, would, simply, be all the worse with that incentive added.² Neither in the one case, nor in the other does he admit, that those, who act against the sober dictates of reason, are free from blame.

Self-control in regard to Pleasure.—If it is asked, how can any reasoning being act against reason ? Aristotle replies, with consistency, that right conduct does not depend merely on knowing what is right. Morality with him is not, as with Plato, a science.³ Gusts of passion, sweeping over the soul, derange the equilibrium of the machine, and hinder the intellect⁴ from working out the practical problem with the exactitude of a problem in mathematics. When passion intrudes, the intellect is like a steamship making her way against wind and tide ; it plies its task with mechanical regularity, but is baffled by

¹ "Ethics," X. ix. 7. Cf. Ps. lviii. 5 ; St. Mk. viii. 18. Cf. "Ethics," III. xii. 7 (*ἀνόητος*). So in the Psalms, folly and madness are predicated of the unholy. Cf. The "forward step and lingering will."—KEBLE'S "Christian Year."

² "Ethics," VII. iv. 4.

³ "Ethics," VII. ii. 4.

⁴ Νοῦς πρακτικός.

disturbing forces. Where, then, is the intellectual flaw, which results in the practical error? The major premiss of the practical syllogism, with Aristotle, the fundamental principle, which underlies all action, indisputable and irrefragable as an axiom in mathematics,¹ is self-preservation, self-development, the happiness of self. But before this principle can be applied to any particular action, an intermediate syllogism must be worked out, consciously or not, to define more exactly the vague and comprehensive term. Is this happiness the enjoyment of the moment, or the complete realisation of man's being? Here an error creeps into the reasoning, and vitiates it. The man deficient in self-control starts with the major premiss, that happiness is to be pursued, but he mistakes the minor premiss.² Pleasure is happiness, he affirms; and he concludes, therefore, that, whatever produces immediate gratification, is to be done. Roughly speaking, two very different trains of thought offer themselves on every occasion. This course of conduct is pleasant, and therefore to be followed; or this course of conduct is wrong, and therefore to be shunned. It is in allowing themselves to be biassed by their passions into choosing amiss, whether they will listen to this or that line of argument, that the fault lies of those, who are weak in restraining themselves. They have,

¹ "Ethics," VII. viii. 4.

² But the drunkard or maniac mistakes the minor premiss in the syllogism, which is subsequent on this; he mistakes the actual circumstances.

all the time, the right principle of action but they use it not; it is, with them, in abeyance;¹ they see it not,² blinded by passion. Too late they regret their error. Those, who do not act on principle are always full of regrets and remorse.³ For the logical illusion, which, by a sleight of hand prompted by passion, substitutes the false for the true, lasts only till the transient wave of passion breaks. Two temperaments Aristotle singles out as specially liable to these inconsistencies, the precipitate and the feeble (faults often found together); the rash, he adds, are better than those, who err through irresolution, as more likely to recover themselves after a fall.⁴

As the English word "incontinency" comes to be used in a restricted sense for the absence of control over a certain class of desires, so Aristotle regards self-indulgence as predicable in regard to other desires than the desire of pleasure, only by resemblance or analogy.⁵ Yet the weakness, the irresolution, through which a man plays the coward in face of danger, is closely akin to the weakness through which he must and will have, what is pleasurable, at any price. For pain is the contradiction of pleasure; to shun the one is to seek the other; and to endure pain is, in

¹ "Ethics," VII. x. 3.

² VII. vii. 2. Here *ἀγνοία* is used inexactly. Cf. Isaiah lvii. 20. (See Note 3 on p. 23.)

³ "Ethics," IX. iv. 10; VII. vii. 2, viii. 1.

⁴ "Ethics," VII. iii. 7. The fault of the *ἀκράτης* is like an epileptic fit rather than a chronic disease.

⁵ "Ethics," VII. iv. 2. Cf. 1 Cor. ix. 25. Cf. "Sir Galahad."—TENNYSON.

fact, to resist the seductions of pleasure.¹ In balancing the vices of cowardice and of continence, Aristotle pronounces cowardice the more involuntary of the two, as depending less on causes, for which man is not responsible; but he admits, that on each separate occasion the latter is less voluntary, the tyranny of habit in this case being more irresistible.² Excessive anger he regards as less inexcusable than excessive indulgence in the appetites of the body, as less insidious, less directly selfish, less enervating, less tainted with that insolent contempt for others, which makes victims of them for the gratification of lust; and on the more questionable ground, that the pain, which provokes anger is more natural, and therefore a more valid excuse than the craving for enjoyment. Anger, with him, is "a kind of wild justice"; and he makes allowance for an outburst of anger caused by a misunderstanding, comparing the choleric and impetuous to a dog, which barks fiercely at an in-offensive stranger.³ With characteristic acuteness he detects the latent weakness in obstinacy, which, while wearing the semblance of self-control, is indeed the very opposite of it.⁴ There may be a firmer exercise of self-control, he says, in relinquishing an opinion or an intention than in clinging to it, whether right or wrong.

¹ Καρτερικός, ἐγκρατής. The profligate are pained in being debarred from their pleasures.—"Ethics," III. xi. 6. Cf. p. 21.

² The hereditary difference of temperament seems not to be taken into account sufficiently.

³ "Ethics," VII. vi. Cf. GRANT, *ad loc.*

⁴ "Ethics," VII. ix. 3.

Four Classes.—Aristotle classifies mankind, from this point of view, in four divisions.¹ The majority, being fairly disposed on the whole, though, not unfrequently, unstable, he divides into those, who keep down their bad desires, and those, who give way to them. The comparatively few, at each end of the scale, are those, who have on principle so subjugated their evil inclinations to reason, systematically and habitually, as to have little or no further trouble with them, and those, who have flung down the reins and abandoned themselves to their base propensities. These he compares to wild beasts, those to gods in their passionless serenity.² In all alike he sees a something, which should direct by warning and encouragement. This is vigorously at work in those, who restrain themselves; it has done its work in those, who are thoroughly virtuous; but in the self-indulgent it is silenced for the moment,³ in the utterly unprincipled for ever. In other words, some, though they have evil desires, are not led by them; they resist and with an effort are victorious; some are so free from evil desires, that to them what is right is intrinsically delightful;⁴ some pursue, what seems pleasurable, even while they think, that they ought not, like a state, where the laws are good, but are not obeyed; some, like a state, where the very laws are bad, make no attempt to restrain themselves,

¹ Ἐγκρατής, ἀκρατής (strong or weak in resisting evil desires); σώφρων, ἀκολαστός (sound in mind or incorrigible).

² "Ethics," VII. i. 1.

³ "Ethics," V. ix. 6.

⁴ Cf. Ps. cxix. 47.

and have no scruple, no compunction, in their depravity.¹

Three stages are noted in this downward process of deterioration ; to know that a particular action is wrong, and yet, swayed by passion, to do it ; to fail to see, that it is wrong, being blinded by passion for the moment ; to know not, that there is any right or wrong in the world, except in accordance with the cravings of one's own evil desires. Thus according to Aristotle, men sink to the level of the brute² beast with no perception of right or wrong ; or rather they fall immeasurably below it, having quenched by their own doing the light, which was to guide them on to perfection.

¹ Aristotle speaks, not very positively, as if those, who err through a conscious and deliberate preference, were better than those, who are guilty of the same fault through want of self-control, as more likely to be cured of their fault, on being convinced of their mistake. But this seems inconsistent with the hardening effect, which Aristotle attributes elsewhere to a conscious, deliberate, habitual preference for what is evil, and these he pronounces incurable.—“Ethics,” VII. vii. 2 ; III. v. 14. Cf. p 39.

² “Ethics,” VII. iii. 11. But brute beasts have a glimmering, at least, of this *ὀφελιψις*.

CHAPTER IV.

THE MOTIVE OF VIRTUOUS CONDUCT.

Happiness the End in View.—Thus far the testimony of Aristotle must be allowed on all hands to be in favour of the morality inculcated by Christianity. He teaches, that man is a free agent; that he is responsible, to himself at least, if to no higher power; that he has a guiding voice within him, which has a right to be obeyed; and that the intention, especially if conscious and deliberate, is what really qualifies the action as good or bad. What then is the bidding of this voice, and what the proper end of man's endeavours? If the answer, which Aristotle makes, is disappointing to those, who seek for a motive higher than self-love, it must be remembered, that the study of ethics, as a separate department of philosophy, was, with him, still in its infancy, and, what is more important, that the circumstances, in which he lived, though predisposing men to welcome a philosophy, tending by the repression of unruly passions to elevate and tranquillise, were inimical to a theory of ethics, based on any other foundation than self-love. The end proposed is happiness;¹ to this the whole current of being must set; and, because without virtue happiness is

¹ "Ethics," I. vii. 4.

impossible, virtuous habits must be acquired and cultivated diligently. Virtue is duly appraised as an indispensable condition of true happiness, but only for this end. Virtue is instrumental in regulating the passions, which would otherwise frustrate the pursuit of happiness by their infatuation. Be good, that you may be happy is the key-note of his philosophy.¹ Self is the centre of his system; regard for self shapes and colours it from first to last. The "Ethics" are Aristotle's answer to the question, "How is man to be happy?"

Self-love.—It is a lofty selfishness. There is nothing sordid, nothing gross about it. It marks as by a high-water line, how high ideal selfishness can be raised. But it is genuine, unalloyed selfishness, and it lies at the very core of the philosophy. Happiness is defined as the proper business of man,² the product of his best faculties,³ the free and healthy exercise, not of his vegetative faculties, not of those which he shares with other

¹ "Good conduct," Mr. Herbert Spencer has said ("Data of Ethics," p. 26), "simultaneously achieves the greatest totality of life in self, in offspring, and in fellow-men." So far as results go, a selfish theory of virtue, though diametrically opposed in motive to the doctrine of self-sacrifice, corresponds with it. So far as relates to results, and not to intention, "conduct is good or bad according as its total effects are pleasurable or painful" (p. 28). But this totality of consequences can be appreciated truly by Omniscience alone.

² "Ethics," I. vii. 14. See Appendix G.

³ "Ethics," I. vii. 14; ix. 7. 'Ενεργεία ψυχῆς κατ' ἀρετήν ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ. But ἀρετή here is not necessarily "virtue," but an excellence (of the soul), whatever that excellence may be.

animals, but of his reason dominating his emotions in art, soaring above them in science into the cloudless æther of abstract intelligence. This happiness is self-sufficing, self-contained, self-evolved;¹ not variable with accidents of time and place; not changing colour, as a chameleon,² in different aspects; habitual, constant, permanent.³ It lasts, while life lasts, undiminished, unimpaired: defection at any time shows, that it never was really.⁴ It excludes not fellowship with others; but they are a secondary consideration; regard for them is only an emanation of self-love, a radiation from the central glow, diffusing and multiplying itself in them by refraction⁵ (p. 63). Though essentially independent of adventitious aids, it needs a suitable equipment for its perfection,⁶ as a casket for the jewel. It is, in a word, the unruffled serenity, inseparable from virtue.⁷ Where could

¹ "Ethics," I. vii. 6, 7, 8.

² "Ethics," I. ix. 8.

³ *E.g.* Cf. "Ethics," II. iv. 3.

⁴ Cf. AUGUSTINE, "De Civitate Dei," xi.

⁵ "Ethics," IX. ix. 5. It makes all the difference, whether a man habitually regards his fellow-creatures as *persons* like himself with claims similar to his own but even stronger, or as *things* instrumental for the gratification of his own wishes. A St. Francis of Assisi personifies even things without life; a Napoleon degrades persons into things. It is hardly an adequate excuse for the habit, as is alleged, of using his fellow-beings as materials for his art, that to Goethe art was a religion, unless tortures inflicted in the name of religion are justifiable. Cf. "The unsympathising, factitious calm of art, in Goethe." CARLYLE, "Life of Sterling," p. 102: but, see also p. 110. Cf. "Characteristics of Christian Morality," p. 22 (2nd edit.).

⁶ "Ethics," I. vii. 16, x. 15; X. vii. 4.

⁷ "Ethics," I. x. 13. Cf. "The Imitation of Christ" (*passim*).

there be a more beautiful ideal of life, if the culture of self, the beatification of self were all in all?

Even when, leaving sublunary things, Aristotle soars upward into the life contemplative, self clings to him. He places contemplation above action as more continuous, more independent, more reposeful, more final.¹ It is, he says, the highest occupation of man's highest faculties. It can only be reached through a strict discipline of the emotions, but it is as superior to the highest moral excellence as the summit of the mountain to the arduous path, which leads to the summit. Emotion disturbs it. Therefore emotions, rightly directed or not, must be hushed into absolute stillness. This is a glorious ideal, so far as it represents the supremacy of reason over passion. But it is a selfish glory after all; even as the devout raptures of the monk in his cell are selfish, so far as they are purchased by the soldier's abandonment of his post in the turmoil and peril of life. The contemplative life is a refined selfishness, the selfish enjoyment of a transcendental bliss incommunicable to mankind generally. The happiness, which Aristotle proposes as the end of being is not something, which all have a title to share in; it is the privilege of a few. He rejects the hedonism or utilitarianism of the vulgar, only to substitute the same thing in disguise.

Self-sacrifice.—It has been no easy thing for moral philosophy to escape from this groove and to emancipate itself from the traditionary influence of this

¹ "Ethics," X. vii.

teaching.¹ Even the plain precepts of self-sacrifice in the Gospel, however prolific of results practically, have failed to eradicate the idea, that virtue is only a prudential self-love, a wise self-love, and not a wise unselfishness.¹ Of course an act of self-sacrifice is, unless done under compulsion and involuntarily, as truly as an act of self-indulgence, the act, which the doer chooses and prefers.² But this obvious fact, that a sense of gratification invariably accompanies every determination, although the determination may be fraught with pain of one kind or another, cannot efface the difference in motive, between an action done for the sake of others and an action for the sake of self.³ It might as fairly be argued, that advantage or enjoyment must be the determining motive in

¹ So far as conventionality implies sympathy with others, so far (but this is not much) Aristotle's moral philosophy does imply something above self-love.

² In speaking of *τὰγαθόν* as *τὸ βουλευτὸν, τὸ προαιρετὸν* (e.g., "Ethics," III. iv. 4), Aristotle cannot conceive the good being another's good. Cf. "Ethics," V. vi. 8, *αὐτὸν οὐδεὶς προαιρεῖται βλάπτειν*. Similarly it is urged, that the motive, which actuates any one, must be "conceived as his own good, though he may conceive it [*sic*] as his own good only on account of his interest in others"; "the motive is always some idea of the man's personal good."—(GREEN, "Prolegomena," pp. 96, 98.) But Christianity, while duly recognising, what may be called the centripetal force, lays the chief emphasis on the centrifugal. "No man hateth his own flesh" (Ephesians v. 29) is more than balanced by "He, that loveth his life, shall lose it," and many other precepts of self-abnegation; e.g., 1 St. John iii. 16, St. John xii. 25.

³ Cf. "Pleasure somewhere, sometime, to some being or beings, is an inextinguishable element in the ultimate moral aim." H. SPENCER.

every virtuous act, because real happiness results from it sooner or later. If the saint or the hero wishes himself "accursed"¹ for the sake of others, it is not, because such a doom gratifies self-love, but because, by sheer force of will, he chooses to care for others more than for himself. That, which he likes and prefers is, in itself, diametrically contrary to that, which self-love would choose. But his love for others is stronger than his love for self.

The sense of duty is the sense of obligation or indebtedness to a person, other than self, substituted for self by sympathy and imagined as having an even more urgent claim than self to be considered. If goodness is unselfish love, and if goodness is better in proportion as the object, to which it devotes itself, is worthier, then unselfish, willing obedience to God is the highest goodness conceivable. Even to refrain from what is wrong is not real goodness, if the motive is mercenary.²

143 *The State.*—The selfish tendency of the "Ethics" is modified by the importance, which Aristotle, like ancient Greeks generally, attached to the political relations.³ Regard for fellow-citizens is a counterpoise to the excessive regard for self. Allegiance to the community stands in the place of duty to a higher power. The statesman is to provide for the moral culture of the citizens, as well as for their material convenience, because he is to provide for

¹ Romans ix. 3.

² Cf. Spinoza, par E. RENAN, 1877.

³ "Ethics," I. ii. 9. Socialism, apart from religion, is an apotheosis of humanity.

their happiness in every respect, and especially in respect of those things, on which happiness most depends. Every citizen is to contribute, according to his ability, to the happiness of all. Here is a practical correction of the theoretical tendency to absorb everything into self and to make use of others for merely selfish purposes. But even here self-love is latent, though not self-love of the baser kind, for the happiness of the individual is bound up with the happiness of his community.

Public Opinion.—Thus, in defining happiness and the way to attain it, Aristotle gives the foremost place among virtuous incentives to reputation, placing it above pleasure and wealth.¹ Not endowed by nature nor by training with the stern sense of justice, which characterised the Roman and the Teuton, nor with the devout awe, which his religion breathed into the Jew, the Greek worshipped the beautiful.² With him vice was an offence against good taste, an impropriety, a deformity; and public opinion was the arbiter. The admiring applause, not indeed of the multitude, but of the select few, is, according to Aristotle, what constitutes the assurance of felicity, and their praise is the spur to exertion.³ It is glory, he says, which incites the brave to deeds of daring.⁴ True magnificence, while disdaining a tasteless display of wealth,⁵ consists

¹ "Ethics," I. iv. 3, v. 4; II. iii. 7; IV. iii. 10.

² *E.g.*, "Ethics," IV. ii. 5, 6, 16.

³ "Ethics," IV. i. 4.

⁴ "Ethics," III. vii. 13.

⁵ "Ethics," IV. ii. 20.

in the possession of things, which are deservedly coveted.¹ Even the life contemplative, divine as it seems in comparison with mundane vicissitudes, has to prove its title to precedence by the wonder and awe, which it provokes in others.² Even excess in the thirst for honour is marked off from all other kinds of excess; it is not classed under the want of self-control; if, indeed, a thing to be shunned, still it is not to be censured severely.

Pleasure.—Aristotle draws a distinction, which, though very important, is sometimes overlooked, between pleasure and happiness. With him happiness means, as we have seen, something intrinsic, permanent, immutable, the crown and consummation of life-long endeavours. Pleasure is transitional and precarious, an adjunct and concomitant of happiness, not itself the end to be pursued.³ Those, who are in all respects masters of themselves, find enjoyment in the abstinence from pleasures, which are harmful; while to the depraved this abstinence is torture.⁴ Aristotle cannot bring himself to allow, that enjoyment is the chief good, the highest aim, in life; but he is too practical not to see, that it is an ingredient in happiness.⁵ He admits, that it sweetens toil,⁶ and assuages trouble, and that, without it, the healthful energies cannot have free play;⁷ but he insists, that it

¹ "Ethics," IV. ii. 11.

² "Ethics," IV. ii. 10.

³ "Ethics," X. iv. 8; X. iii. 5. Cf. St. Matthew vi. 33.

⁴ "Ethics," II. iii. 1.

⁵ "Ethics," VII. xii.

⁶ Cf. "The labour we delight in physics pain," SHAKESPEARE.

⁷ "Ethics," VII. xiv. Cf. VII. xiii. 2.

implies and presupposes a want, an incompleteness.¹ It does not follow, he says, that pleasure is of no account at all,² because it is not the best of all things. He has no praise for the apathy, which looks on what is agreeable with stolid indifference;³ but he distrusts the fascination, which pleasure exercises over her votaries, warping and distorting their judgment by the illusions of sense;⁴ and he quotes approvingly the legendary saying, "Send away Helen, if you would decide rightly."⁵

Perhaps Aristotle would not have assigned so high a place even as this to pleasure, but for the fear of seeming to propose an impracticable ideal. He saw the inconsistencies of many, who were loud in decrying pleasure and in vaunting their contempt for it.⁶ He dreaded overstatements, especially of a sentimental kind. After all, in making pleasure secondary, the consequence and not the thing aimed at, his teaching coincides with the precepts of the Gospel; but the primary motive with him is self-improvement, not duty to God and man.⁷

Pleasure, with Aristotle, is far above that ignoble gratification of the senses, which is too commonly

¹ *E.g.*, "Ethics," X. iii. 6.

² "Ethics," X. i. 2.

³ "Ethics," II. iii. 5. Cf. "Solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant."—TACITUS. "Ethics," III. xi. 7.

⁴ "Ethics," III. iv. 5.

⁵ "Ethics," II. ix. 6.

⁶ "Ethics," X. i. The practical inconsistencies of Christians have tended in the same way to lower the tone of the moral philosophy of Christianity. Monachism and Calvinism have done much to make Christian morality selfish.

⁷ *E.g.*, St. Matthew vi. 33.

all, that is meant by the word. As happiness, with him, is the highest development, of which man's nature is capable,¹ so the pleasure, which accompanies it, must be such as commends itself to the reason² of the virtuous;³ conducive to health; consistent with propriety; not incommensurate with a man's means. In the vulgar notion of pleasure he detects an unrest and a vacuity, essentially incompatible with true happiness. Sensual pleasure, he says, is preceded by an uneasy craving; while the pleasure, which the wise and good enjoy in the free exercise of their highest faculties, is uninterrupted by pain.⁴ His theory of pleasure is that of a race exquisitely alive to every thrill of pleasure or of pain,⁵ and of an age, which had not yet learnt, from the Cross on Calvary, that unselfish endurance, for others' sake, as it is the highest purpose in life, so brings with it, although unsought, the abiding happiness, independent of external things, which Aristotle imagined in vain. Not that pain, any more than pleasure, is to be sought for its own sake. Nor is there any danger, as some apprehend, lest the spirit of self-sacrifice, could it ever possess mankind, should result in a general frustration of happiness on all sides. The fear is chimerical. Even were it conceivable, that self-interest could ever be so thrust aside, the antidote to a suicidal fanaticism would be found in the fact, that self-preservation, as a rule, is an

¹ *E.g.*, "Ethics," X. vi.

² "Ethics," X. iv. 8.

³ "Ethics," X. v. 10.

⁴ "Ethics," VII. xiv. Cf. III. xi. 6. ⁵ "Ethics," II. vii. 3.

indispensable preliminary to benefiting others, and, therefore, as a rule, a duty not to be neglected. Clearly, too, even with purely unselfish motives at work, the result would be the happiness not only of those receiving, but of those, who confer benefits.¹ The truth on pleasure as a motive is well summed up by one of the most eminent writers of our day. "Pleasure (somewhere, at some time, to some being or beings) is an inexpugnable element in the conception . . . of the ultimate moral aim."² The pleasure may be to self, to fellow-creatures or to a power above all. That pleasure, in the largest sense of the word, is invariably an ingredient in the determining motive,³ may be admitted by those, who are not hedonists, with the proviso, that the moral character of the act depends on the further question, whether the advantage is sought for self or for another. It goes without saying, that the will finds a pleasure in consenting, however reluctantly, for, otherwise, the will would not consent. But this pleasure may be either for self or, by sympathy, for another. Christianity teaches that this pleasure is to be found, first, in God; next, in one's neighbour;

¹ Cf. "Mercy . . . is twice blessed;

It blesseth him, that gives, and him, that takes."

SHAKSPEARE.

² H. SPENCER, "Data of Ethics," p. 123.

³ "Ethics," VII. ix. 4. Neoptolemus speaks the truth, because it pleases him. If this means only, that he does what he prefers, it is a truism and a tautology. If it means, that he is actuated by the desire for what is pleasurable to himself, the motive is inferior to the desire simply to do right.

lastly, in oneself. The practical inconsistencies of Christians cannot abrogate this royal law of love. If the religion "of amity" becomes too often a religion "of enmity,"¹ this only shows, that they, who profess a creed, do not always practise it. The life and death of one such man as Charles Gordon show, that the ideal, however difficult, is not beyond attainment.²

Moderation.—It is strictly in keeping with the utilitarian basis of his philosophy, that Aristotle, in default of an authoritative rule of right and wrong, has recourse to the idea, especially congenial to a Greek,³ of proportion. Questions of morality, he

¹ H. Spencer. Cf. "Study of Sociology," p. 175.

² "The impracticability of 'the ideal' produces a despairing abandonment of all attempts at a higher life" (H. SPENCER, "Data of Ethics," p. v.). The hopelessness of these words is in strange contrast to the description in the New Testament of the "great multitude, which no man could number," of saints (Revelations vii. 9). Besides, an ideal may have cases of its own, even if it cannot be realised completely. "Up to a certain point altruistic action blesses giver and receiver; beyond that point it curses both" ("Study of Sociology," p. 181). Mr. Spencer argues that in desiring to make others happy every one will neglect himself and so be incapacitated for helping others. But self-preservation *for the sake of others* is a corollary of self-sacrifice; it is an integral part of it, or rather an indispensable preliminary. As for the objection, that altruism encourages selfishness in the recipients, these also, on the hypothesis, are givers, and, by consequence, habitually unselfish. "As society develops [*sic*], the duties of men towards each other become more numerous and more complex; and consequently the opportunities for having regard to each other must increase" (Dr. WACE, Paper read at the Victoria Institute, p. 18). This alone is the answer to the pessimistic question, "Is life worth living?"

³ Cf. the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers. See Appendix H.

says, must be answered according to the circumstances of each particular case;¹ no absolute rule can be laid down;² the only practicable test is, to avoid extremes, and to remember, that virtue is to be found between excess and defect.³ The rule is admirable in the abstract. But practically, as Aristotle himself is constrained to own, the marksman has to aim at a target, continually shifting its position before his eyes.⁴ Where the fault to be shunned is a graver fault on the one side than on the other, or when there is a personal bias in the one direction or in the other,⁵ there the virtue to be aimed at stands not midway between the vices to be avoided. It is impracticable to define the position of that, which is excessive, on the one hand and defective on the other, till excess and defect have been themselves defined.⁶

Virtues enumerated. — The Aristotelian catalogue of virtues is far from being exhaustive. Throughout it presents self-love, duly regulated by prudence, as the mainspring of action; ambition, instead of being rebuked as a greedy craving for self-aggrandisement, is commended, with the vague proviso, that it must

¹ "Ethics," II. ii. 2.

² "Ethics," II. ii. 3.

³ *E.g.*, "Ethics," II. vi. 4, 9, 13. Cf. *μηδὲν ἄγαν*. Cf. I Corinthians ix. 25; Philipians iv. 5.

⁴ "Ethics," II. vi. 8, 9.

⁵ Cf. "Compound for sins that they're inclined to," &c. ("Hudibras").

⁶ Cf. *ἑσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί* ("Ethics," II. vi. 14). Cf. St. Matthew vii. 14.

not be misdirected nor pushed to excess;¹ meekness, on the other hand, is valued, only as promoting evenness of temper;² the man, who is slow to revenge himself, it is added, is guilty of a blunder,³ and behaves like a slave.⁴

The conception, otherwise lofty, of the magnanimous man, the ideal hero, the embodiment of what is great and good, is disfigured by the pride of self-assertion.⁵ He appraises himself highly;⁶ he despises others;⁷ he has a short memory for benefits received.⁸ In social intercourse his first consideration is, what will redound to his own credit;⁹ he interposes to prevent serious mischief, provided that his intervention will not involve much annoyance to himself.¹⁰ He is a thorough egotist. Similarly the manly bearing of the soldier or of the athlete is made to depend on the pursuit of glory and on the dread of disgrace.¹¹ Aristotle would approve the sayings (ascribed severally to Emerson and to Seneca), "Self-trust

¹ "Ethics," IV. iv. Cf. p. 52.

² "Ethics," IV. v. 3.

³ "Ethics," IV. v. 13.

⁴ "Ethics," IV. v. So Spinoza taught, that humility and repentance are not virtues, because they are consequences of weakness and inferiority.—Spinoza, par E. RENAN, 1877.

⁵ Contrast I Corinthians xiii. ; Romans xii. 10, &c.

⁶ "Ethics," IV. iii. 3.

⁷ "Ethics," IV. iii. 22. Contrast

"The man who feels contempt

For any living thing, hath faculties,

Which he has never used," &c.—WORDSWORTH.

⁹ "Ethics," IV. iii. 25.

⁸ "Ethics," I. x. 13.

¹⁰ "Ethics," IV. vi. 6, 7.

¹¹ "Ethics," III. viii. 3. Cf. III. ix. 3.

is the essence of heroism," "Take away ambition and vanity, and where will be your heroes and patriots?"¹

Justice.—Aristotle, or his pupil, rightly assigns a twofold meaning to justice. In the larger sense, it includes every obligation to others, the whole domain of duty; in the narrower sense, it is the fulfilment of contracts and engagements.² In either sense justice may seem, at first sight, an exception to the Aristotelian rule, that a wise regard to self is the motive of virtue. He remarks, that justice alone of virtues has reference to another person, and acts for the advantage of others;³ and this, he adds in words, which are significant of the inherent principle of his morality, constitutes the especial difficulty of being just.⁴ Again, the latent selfishness of his morality betrays itself in the suggestion, that ingratitude is impolitic, as likely to check the flow of favours in the future.⁵ Though he consistently applies to justice the test, which he applies to every virtue, insisting, that justice is not merely doing what is just, but doing it with a just intention and from the wish to be just,⁶ yet, if

¹ Στάσιμος ("Ethics," IV. iii. 34) may be compared with Goethe's "Ohne rast, ohne hast." Cf. Isaiah xxx. 15.

² "Ethics," V. i. 15, τελεία ἀρετὴ πρὸς ἕτερον. So πλεονεξία includes lust in 1 Thessalonians iv. Cf. Romans xiii. 7, 10. Cf. St. Matthew i. 19.

"All being brought into a sum,
What place or person call for, he doth pay."

G. HERBERT.

³ "Ethics," V. i. 17.

⁴ "Ethics," V. i. 18.

⁵ "Ethics," V. iv

⁶ "Ethics," V. i. 3.

pressed to give a fundamental motive for justice, he would answer, that injustice means the disintegration of society, and the consequent ruin of each and all. His comparison of justice to a sum in proportion, while implying, that justice is with him a matter of calculation, shows, that he takes into account, what there may be differential in each case.¹ Equitable-ness, or a willingness to concede to others,² is his corrective of the mechanical and stereotyped justice, which doles out, what the law demands, and nothing more.³ Questions are raised, whether a man can be injured with his own consent,⁴ and whether self-murder is wrong.⁵ The former is answered by Aristotle's own teaching, that the intention of the agent is, what qualifies the act. To answer the latter rightly, a higher standpoint is required, than pagan ethics can supply.

Friendship.—Nowhere does Aristotle approach so near to an unselfish theory of virtue as in his books on friendship; and yet even here he fails to reach it. A glimpse is given of something brighter and better than self-interest, but the clouds quickly close over it again. The moralist soars upward; but he soon sinks down with flagging wing, drawn by an irresistible attraction to self as the centre of gravitation. It seems as if, at last, virtue were to be re-

¹ "Ethics," V. iv. 2, 3, 9, τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς κατ' ἀναλογίαν.

² "Ethics," V. x., ἐπιεικεία.

³ Cf. "The quality of mercy is not strained."

SHAKESPEARE.

⁴ "Ethics," V. ix.

⁵ "Ethics," V. xi. 2, 3. Cf. III. ii.

vealed in all her loveliness; but the expectation is disappointed. After all, the friend is only self disguised very cleverly.

Friendship, like the kindred virtue, patriotism, throve luxuriantly in the sun-lit atmosphere of Greece; so as, indeed, to need the careful hand of the pruner and to degenerate at times into a rank and poisonous weed. The allegation is groundless, that Christianity takes no notice of friendship;¹ the Gospel reinforces all, that was tender and noble in the friendships of the older dispensation.² It sanctions all, that was not merely provisional in the earlier discipline of life, by the precept and example of Him who came "not to destroy, but to fulfil."³ It is a great saying of Aristotle, that, where friendship is, there is no need of justice with her strict demands.⁴ So Christianity teaches, that "Love is the fulfilling of the law."

A kind intention towards any one, Aristotle insists, is not friendship, unless reciprocated.⁵ There must be the mutual pleasure, which springs from having the same likings and dislikings and from enjoying frequent opportunities of being together.⁶ Thus defined, friendship may seem only a partnership in trade

¹ GRANT, "Ethics," I. 250.

² *E.g.*, David and Jonathan. Earthly friendships are typical of the friendship between God and man.

³ *E.g.*, St. John xv. 15.

⁴ "Ethics," VIII. i. 4.

⁵ "Ethics," VIII. ii. 3. Cf. 1 St. John iv. 19.

⁶ "Ethics," IX. iv. 1. Cf. "Idem velle atque nolle, eademum firma est amicitia."—TACITUS.

for mutual convenience. But Aristotle is careful, as always, to eliminate selfishness of a sordid or vulgar type. It is not the short-lived gratification of having a pleasant companion, nor the profit, which may be extracted from his good services, which is to be looked for in a friend.¹ Nor is he to be valued primarily for the sake even of a more true enjoyment or a more solid advantage, but for the sake of himself; not because he can do much for the happiness of his comrade, but because he is, what he is.² His existence is to be desired for his own sake.³ Accordingly friendship must not be precipitate: time and intimacy are required to ripen it.⁴ True friendship is the concentration, not the dissipation of the affections; it is not like the butterfly roving from flower to flower, but steadfast and abiding.⁵ Thus the only perfect friendship is the friendship of the good.⁶ For the unprincipled are fickle and inconstant;⁷ and friends are often severed by the weakness or wickedness of either.⁸ The true friend deliberately practises everything, that is excellent, for the sake of his friend.⁹

Thus portrayed friendship seems at first sight not far removed from the unselfish love of a mother for her child; and self-love seems relegated to its proper place, as a secondary motive. But self is still in the

¹ "Ethics," VIII. iii. 1.

² "Ethics," VIII. ii. 3.

³ "Ethics," IX. iv. 1.

⁴ "Ethics," VIII. iii. 8.

⁵ "Ethics," IX. x. 6. Cf. Proverbs xxiii. 26; Deut. vi. 5.

⁶ "Ethics," VIII. iii. 6.

⁷ "Ethics," IX. xii. 3.

⁸ "Ethics," IX. iii.

⁹ "Ethics," IX. iv. 1.

ascendant. Each of the friends is studying his own happiness in the happiness of the other. It is not, that the friend displaces self, supersedes self, is enthroned in the heart instead of self, but that self is gazing at itself in the friend as in a mirror. Self is not merged in the friend; he is a second self; not a substitute for self, but a self projected as an object of admiration and esteem.¹ Even the happiest, Aristotle says, need a friend, in whom to contemplate their own felicity, and in whom they may find a conscious exercise for the beneficent energies, which would otherwise be inert and sterile. A solitary life, however blissful in itself, is a life truncated; it hungers for friendship, to develope all that is useful and agreeable in itself.² Self-love, Aristotle tells us explicitly, is proper and commendable in those, who live according to reason; it is out of place only in those who are slaves to their passions.³ To die for another, he says rightly,⁴ is the culmination of self-sacrifice. But, if the motive is to gain the applause of others or of oneself, the seeming self-sacrifice is really selfish.⁵

Throughout his treatment of friendship Aristotle seems endeavouring ineffectually to rise above selfish considerations. It is honourable, he says, to do good to others without seeking a recompense, though the recompense is not to be despised.⁶ He sees the

¹ "Ethics," IX. iv. 1. Cf. IX. ix. 1, *φίλος ἑταίρος αὐτός*.

² "Ethics," IX. ix. 5.

³ "Ethics," IX. viii. 6.

⁴ Cf. St. John xv. 13.

⁵ "Ethics," IX. viii. 9.

⁶ "Ethics," VIII. xiii. 8. Cf. IX. xii. 1.

same unconscious struggle in the world around him. Most men, he says, wish to be loved for the sake of the honour which redounds to them through their friends:¹ and yet a mother is happy in the happiness of her child, even though she knows, that the child has no thought of her.² There can be no friendship, he says, with things inanimate; and yet too many use their friends merely as instruments for profit or amusement.³ In one aspect, he admits, friendship is an affair, in which men barter their several commodities; but those, who are disappointed in this way, have only themselves to thank, for putting the wrong consideration in the first place, and for loving, not their friend, but what belonged to him.⁴ The exchange must be equitable; that is, with due regard to possibility, and on the principle, which Aristotle is never weary of reiterating, that the intention is the main thing.⁵ As always, circumstances must be taken into account; for instance, more is due to a benefactor than to one who is only a pleasant companion. Why is it, he asks, that those, who have conferred a favour, love the recipient more, than they are loved by him?⁶ He repudiates the sordid supposition, that they calculate on being repaid with usury; but he argues, that in benefiting others men are more able to realise their own superiority, and that

¹ "Ethics," VIII. viii. 1.

² "Ethics," VIII. viii. 3.

³ "Ethics," VIII. viii. 6. Cf. note 5, p. 47.

⁴ "Ethics," IX. i. 3. See note 5, p. 47.

⁵ "Ethics," IX. ii. Cf. V. ix. 11.

⁶ Cf. "Odisse quem læseris."—TACITUS.

the retrospective delight arising from this sense of superiority outlasts the enjoyment of pecuniary gain.¹ They who excel their friends in goodness must be loved more than they love; otherwise there will be a disparity or rather a disproportion.² The man of great soul, Aristotle says, must not rally his friends round him in his misfortune, for it would humiliate him to be helped by them. A friend cannot wish his friends to enjoy perfect felicity, for then they would want his aid no more.³ Even the love of kinsmen is resolved into the consideration of the profit or pleasure accruing thereby.⁴ The idea of barter recurs continually; and the attempt to reconcile the conflicting principles of self-interest and benevolence blurs and distorts the loveliness of true friendship.⁵

Pagan friendship is restricted within a small circle,⁶ slaves are excluded; they are machines, not men in the full sense.⁷ Women and children are admissible only on a lower footing.⁸ The friend, who proves unworthy, must be cast adrift. It is wrong, indeed, to forget in a moment all the intimacy of the past,⁹ or, not to come to the rescue, if there is likelihood of

¹ "Ethics," IX. vii. 6.

² "Ethics," VIII. vii. But in purely unselfish friendship the higher raises the lower to his own level. So God raises man.

³ "Ethics," VIII. vii. 6. Cf. IX. iv. 4.

⁴ "Ethics," VIII. xii.

⁵ "Ethics," VIII. vii. 6.

⁶ Contrast St. M., v. 44. Cf. "Ethics," VIII. xi. 7.

⁷ "Ethics," VIII. xi. 6, *ἐμψυχον ὄργανον*. See Appendix I.

⁸ "Ethics," VIII. x. 5. Cf. V. vi. 9, *τὰ τέκνα*.

⁹ "Ethics," IX. iii. 5. Cf. "Tales amicitiae dissuendae non dirumpendae sunt."—CICERO.

extricating a friend from the consequences of his fault;¹ but, if the predicament looks hopeless, a prudent man will keep at a safe distance.² With Aristotle friendship, like happiness, like virtue, is the privilege of a chosen few; Christian brotherhood is for all. So, the charitable associations of Pagan Rome were for special political purposes only;³ those, which Christianity has created and fostered, are world-wide in their range.

¹ "Ethics," IX. iii. 3.

² "Ethics," IX. iii. 3; Contrast Galatians vi. 2; St. Luke xix. 10. Aristotle disparages forgiveness (see p. 58). Cf. DÖLLINGER, "Jew and Gentile," p. 341.

³ "Collegia."

CHAPTER V.

IMMORTALITY.

Apparent Inconsistency.—It would be easy to cite from the writings of Aristotle passages not a few apparently contradicting one another on the question, whether or not there is a life beyond the present life for man. This discrepancy is in part merely a discrepancy of expression; for, occasionally he borrows a phrase in vogue, if it will serve to illustrate his meaning, even though it cannot pass muster critically, and uses for the purpose of the moment a conventional opinion, as a traveller uses the current coin of a foreign country, without stopping to test its intrinsic value. Thus he speaks of sacrifices for the dead, of swearing by the dead, of calling the dead enviable.¹ Partly, too, it arises from the difference between esoteric and exoteric teaching. For Aristotle was a man of the world as well as a philosopher; he adapts his terminology, as the treatise is abstruse or practical. Above all, the discrepancy is the inevitable embodiment of an actual incertitude, such as varies with varying moods, presenting, for instance, a future existence to the imagination clearly on the breezy

¹ DÖLLINGER, "Jew and Gentile, p. 338.

summit of the mountain, dimly amid the stifling fumes of the laboratory. He longs for a happiness more unalloyed than is attainable here, for something more restful than the onward march of science, for an unimpeded, uninterrupted flow of healthful energies, such as the vicissitudes of this life cannot permit. As a close observer of life, he cannot close his eyes to the fact, that a certain amount, at least, of outward prosperity is wanted for the inward serenity, absolute in itself, if it is only as a frame to the picture, as a setting for the jewel. Health and wealth, a good reputation, length of days, friends and clients, propitious seasons, and other external advantages, all conduce to happiness; they minister to it, though they cannot constitute it; they are not essential to it, but their absence weakens and impairs it; and all these are precarious and unstable.¹ Even the man, who, so far as he is himself concerned, stands firm as a four-square tower,² and presents an inexpugnable front to his assailants, needs to be surrounded by others like himself. The plaintive cry is forced even from the compressed lips of Aristotle, that there is no continuous enjoyment on earth, for there is no possibility of continuous energising.³ But no certain answer comes to him from the darkness.

As a physiologist, Aristotle speaks of an immortality; but it is an immortality of a species,⁴

¹ "Ethics," I. viii. 6, 17, εὐετηρία, εὐημερία, κ.τ.λ.

² "Ethics," I. x. 11, τετραγώνος ἀνευ ψόγου.

³ "Ethics," X. iv. 9, οὐδεὶς συνεχῶς ἡδεται, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνεργεῖ.

⁴ GRANT, "Ethics," I. p. 299.

not of an individual. Arguing against the Platonic notion of memory, he implies, that, as there can have been no previous existence of the soul, so there can be no future existence in store for it. Generally in the Ethics he avoids the question, as scarcely bearing on the subject before him. If he touches it at all, it is with the neutrality of an agnostic or of a positivist in the present day. He leaves it undetermined, whether the dead have any cognisance of what happens on earth to those, who were dearest to them,¹ contenting himself with saying, that, if they have any such cognisance at all, it can only be of the faintest kind and hardly appreciable.² It is very ungracious, he says, to oppose popular prejudices on such a subject, but he is reluctantly compelled for the truth's sake.³ In discussing Solon's aphorism, that no one is to be pronounced happy before death, he calls it altogether absurd, to understand Solon as meaning, that there can be any happiness after death, for after death there can be no more energising.⁴ In depicting courage, he remarks incidentally, that after death there seems to be neither good nor evil;⁵ and that the happiest are those who have most cause to

¹ "Ethics," I. xi. 5, 6. Cf. "The Two Voices."

TENNYSON.

² "Ethics," I. xi. Cf. *νεκίων ἀμενηνὰ κάρηνα*.

HOMER.

³ "Ethics," I. xi. 1, *λίαν ἄφελον*.

⁴ "Ethics," I. x. 2, *παντελῶς ἄτοπον*. Cf. "Dicique beatus, Ante obitum nemo supremaque funera debet."

⁵ "Ethics," III. vi. 6. The words on suicide in "Ethics," III. ii., are neutral as to a life beyond the grave.

dread dying.¹ Here on earth, and now in the life present, if anywhere and at any time, is to be found the happiness, which Aristotle proposes to his disciples as their aim in life.

Personal Immortality.—So far, then, as can be ascertained from dubious and conflicting statements, Aristotle excludes from his philosophy a personal immortality.² He rejects the Pythagorean doctrine of the soul passing from one body to another, together with the Platonic doctrine, that the experiences of this life bear witness to a life in the past. He distinguishes the creative from the receptive intelligence in man; or, to anticipate the terms of modern philosophy, the reason from the understanding.³ The intelligence, which is receptive of sensations, a particle or emanation from the universal soul, depends for existence on the body, to which it imparts completeness and individuality,⁴ as the seal to the wax, and to which it stands in the relation of artist to his instrument, of pilot to his boat, or of master to his slave.⁵ This receptive intelligence is diverse and peculiar in each person; though not the body, it belongs to the body;⁶ with

¹ "Ethics," III. ix. 4. Grant rightly observes, that the passage (III. ii. 7) on exemption from death being for men an impossibility, has no bearing on the question of a future life (GRANT; *ad loc.*)

² GRANT, "Ethics," I. 299.

³ GRANT, "Ethics," I. 297.

⁴ 'Εντελέχεια.

⁵ "Ethics," VIII. xi. 6; GRANT, "Ethics," I. 295, 296.

⁶ WESTMINSTER REVIEW, LX. (New Series), p. 351.

all its functions of thought, memory, consciousness, and so forth, it ceases to be, when the vegetative life of the body ceases, for it is inseparable from it. But the creative soul, which shapes and informs the universe, is indestructible, unlike the body, in which it sojourns for a time. It is one and the same in every person. All that is personal and individual dies with the body.¹ The stars, Aristotle says, are far more divine than man;² for there is no sure and certain hope of immortality for him.³

¹ GRANT, "Ethics," I. 298.

² "Ethics," VI. vii. 4. Cf. Psalms viii. 4, 5; cxiii. 5. Cf. GRANT, "Ethics," I. 286, 287.

³ The distinction which Aristotle draws, between the *νοῦς* and the *πρακτικὸς λόγος* supports, negatively, the belief, that personality does not reside in the intellect, but in the will, and, positively, the belief, that life eternal is in union with God, *c.g.*, "Ethics," IX. iv. 4, *δόξει δ' ἂν τὸ νοῦν ἑκαστος εἶναι, ἢ μάλιστα*; X. vii. 9, *δόξει δ' ἂν εἶναι ἑκαστος τοῦτο, ἑπὲρ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον*.

CHAPTER VI.

DEITY.

Popular Phraseology.—What has been said of Aristotle on the question of an immortal soul, is true of him in great measure on the question of the existence and attributes of God. By bringing face to face his exoteric and esoteric teachings, and by contrasting his conventional phrases with those of a more precisely philosophical kind, he may easily be made to contradict himself. The wise man he says, is a favourite of God.¹ He speaks of praying for things absolutely best, that they may be best for ourselves.² He even uses the term “gods,” as if a believer in the polytheism of the vulgar.³ The friendship of parents with their children is compared with the friendship of gods with men.⁴ Honour is due to gods as to parents, because from them comes succour.⁵ The gods are above being praised by men.⁶ But it is only a hypothetical assent, after all, which he gives to current beliefs on this point. As about the soul, so about the deity, he shuns making

¹ “Ethics,” X. viii. 13.

² “Ethics,” V. i. 9.

³ “Ethics,” I. xii. 3, 4; IX. ii. 8. See Appendix J.

⁴ “Ethics,” VIII. xii. 5.

⁵ “Ethics,” VIII. xiv. 4.

⁶ “Ethics,” I. xii. 4.

an explicit declaration.¹ In speaking of the wise as very dear to heaven, he adds significantly, if the gods have any care for man and exercise any superintendence over his affairs.² Happiness, he says, may well be called a gift from the gods, if, indeed, there is anything which comes to man from them.³

Atheism.—Apart from particular expressions, which may or may not have weight in helping us to formulate Aristotle's opinions on this point, there is much in the general tenor of his moral philosophy which separates him from those, who deny the existence of a God. Even while avowedly it makes man the judge of what is right, his philosophy bears tacit witness to the existence of God, so far as it bears witness to the existence of a moral order in the world. The supremacy, which he assigns to reason in man,⁴ and the obedience, which he claims for it from the lower parts of his nature, indicate the presence in the universe of a divine, over-ruling intelligence. The teleologic form, in which his argument is cast, implies design. The gradual ascent from the life vegetative to life intellectual points upward to a yet higher Being. Consciousness in man suggests an existence external to the material world. The vital force, originating the incessant

¹ "Ethics," I. iii. 6; vi. 14; vii. 18. Cf. Dr. Johnson's Prayer, "In this world, where much is to be done and little to be known," &c.

² "Ethics," X. viii. 13.

³ "Ethics," I. ix. 2.

⁴ *E.g.*, "Ethics," V. xi. 9.

movement, which symbolises growth and decay alike, whence is the origin of it? ¹

Pantheism.—The drift, then, of the Aristotelian philosophy is far from irreconcilable with the supremacy of an infinite Being. But the language of Aristotle is equivocal, at one time vaguely deistic, at another pantheistic. On the one hand he speaks of what are called the laws of nature as necessary only “conditionally,” and as “means to an end.” ² On the other hand he speaks of the universe, as if “self-designed,” “a design without a designer.” ³ He speaks of the supreme intelligence, at one time, as of a commander ordering his troops; at another time, as of the spirit of discipline, which animates them. ⁴ It is the great central object of all desire and of all thought, the aim and end of all being, ⁵ setting all things in motion, ⁶ itself immoveable nor liable to

¹ Aristotle speaks of chance, from the subjective point of view, as man’s incertitude about the future, not as an intrinsic fortuitousness in the events themselves. “Ethics,” I. ix. x. Cf. GRATRY, “La Connaissance de Dieu.” Paris, 1864.

² Cf. GRANT, “Ethics,” I. 280, 281. The immutability of natural laws, while negating some popular misconceptions (Cf. H. Spencer, “Study of Sociology,” p. 437), does not negative the conception of a divine government. Omniscience can frame laws immutable, which shall fit themselves to every possible emergency. Nor does “evolution” really “exclude creation,” for evolution traces itself back ultimately to a creating power.

³ GRANT, “Ethics,” I. 282, 283.

⁴ GRANT, “Ethics,” I. 290, 291.

⁵ GRANT, “Ethics,” I. 221, 222.

⁶ GRANT, “Ethics,” I. 221.

change ;¹ but it is not with him, as with Plato, the architect of the universe. It is self-existent, eternal ; but so is the universe. It is an unceasing energy, not a mere potentiality ; but it works without volition. It contemplates itself ; but it is utterly incomprehensible by man. It is form, unalloyed by matter ; but it pervades a material world. It is one ; but it is inseparable from the universe. It is at once personal and impersonal ; it is an individual and an idea. It is infinite power, but not infinite benevolence. In the bliss of self-contemplation it is serenely indifferent to right and wrong among men.² Pagan philosophy can go no further.³

¹ GRANT, "Ethics," I. 289.

² *V.s. e.g.*, "Sapientum templa serena."—LUCRETIVS.

³ Cf. DÖLLINGER, "Jew and Gentile," II. 334, 335 ; GRANT, "Ethics," I. 289, 293 ; WESTMINSTER REVIEW (New Series), LX. 335.

CHAPTER VII.

CONCLUSION.

The Limitations of the Aristotelian Moral Philosophy.—In surveying the Ethics of Aristotle as a whole, three things stand out conspicuously admirable; the delight of friendship, the stately seemliness of self-control, the blissful serenity of contemplation. But these excellences are marred, as we have seen, by the defects inseparable from the time and place, in which he lived. What he sees, he sees clearly; what he knows, he knows thoroughly; what he can grasp firmly, he can appreciate fully; but in every direction his range of vision is circumscribed by barriers impassable for him. He cripples the free expansion of all, that is noblest in man's nature, by subordinating all other motives to regard for self. The true purpose of man's existence, he says rightly, is to do well the work, which belongs to him.¹ But this work, according to his teaching, is to develop himself for himself, not for others and for God.

Nor can this well be otherwise, so long as his philosophy can impart no higher teaching, than what was conventionally current in his day, and can claim

¹ "Ethics," II. vi. 2.

no higher sanction, than public opinion.¹ The imperfect aspirations of pagan morality are perfected in the revelation of divine love through Jesus Christ; for man's gratitude finds in that love a motive and a sanction for willing self-sacrifice, such as Altruism, even the purest, can never supply by itself. The Utilitarianism even of culture and æstheticism is less able, even than Altruism, to raise itself above the Aristotelian ideal. In their result self-interest and self-sacrifice may coincide, for self-sacrifice tends through self-control to true happiness. But so long as the rightful order is inverted, and self-interest is made the end in view, the endeavour frustrates itself and the end is unattainable. When man's true ideal is set before him, in the triumph of self-sacrifice on Calvary, then, notwithstanding the ineradicable hindrances, which are at work within man and without to the end of time, his nature is emancipated from the bondage of self for that service, which alone is "perfect freedom."

An able writer has said that "the radical error of Aristotle's philosophy is the false abstraction and isolation of the intellectual from the material sphere in nature and in human life."² This is an error, which the progress of experimental psychology tends more and more to correct, by showing material forces at

¹ Aristotle's recognition of a conventional morality so far as this recognition is based on sympathy, implies, tacitly and unconsciously, that self is subordinate to regard for others. See Note 1, p. 49.

² WESTMINSTER REVIEW (New Series), No. LX., p. 370.

work in man's intellect and emotions. But for those practical purposes, which are indeed the ultimate aim of moral philosophy, a radical defect in the ethics of Aristotle is the non-recognition of sin.¹ It makes all the difference, in the formation of character, whether wrong-doing is (as, apparently, in Goethe's autobiography) only a blunder, which thwarts man's chances of being happy, or a defilement of the soul, loathsome and hideous, for which he is himself responsible. Regret or remorse for having made a mistake, entailing disagreeable consequences,² is very different from sorrow for having offended a loving Father. The ambition to be as God, and, like God, to enjoy a painless and passionless existence recoils upon itself, and, instead of lifting man nearer to his ideal, leaves him in an abnormal isolation, a mere parody of what he dreamed to be.

It belongs to the physiologist, according to Aristotle,³ to say, how the ignorance is to be dispelled, which knows not, what is right and what is wrong. Pagan morality, confronted by the perversity, which refuses to see any reason, why virtue is to be preferred to vice, is silent. Nor do the Ethics of Aristotle encourage the hopes that the moral principles, which they enunciate so clearly, admit of a progressive development, which shall enable the moralist to answer

¹ The difference in the meanings of *ἄγνος* and *ῥυσις* in Christian and Pagan writers illustrates the difference in their ways of regarding virtue and vice.

² "Ethics," IX. ix. 11.

³ "Ethics," VII. iii. 12.

the sceptic, who questions the existence of morality. But in another land and among a people, who to the favourite of Alexander might seem scarcely worth a thought, a purer and loftier morality ripened slowly to its maturity. In the fulness of time, fore-measured by Omniscience, when the Alexandrine empire had crumbled to dust before the indomitable legions of Rome, the heavenly precepts, imparted to the Chosen People in the Desert and in Canaan, were consummated in Him, in Whose Gospel all, that is imperishable in the moral philosophy of Greece, lives on for ever.

Like a king on his death-bed, the moral philosophy of Ancient Greece points with faltering hand to the successor who shall ascend the vacant throne ; or rather, in the full glory of its meridian, it resigns its crown and sceptre to the rightful Lord of Humanity, whose "kingdom shall have no end." His teaching, His example, His self-sacrifice transform suffering into discipline, despair into resignation, and raise human nature, prostrate before an inexorable fate, to the self-conquest, which is the union of the soul with God.

APPENDICES.



APPENDIX A. (See p. vii.)

THE SYLLOGISM.

“OF course, even before Aristotle, philosophy had been attempting to make its inductions; in other words, to form a collection of facts, from which to elicit laws of general application. This is not a method peculiar to philosophers, but common to every mind. We are all so constituted as to perceive a resemblance, and to classify instinctively the objects, which we perceive, according to their resemblance. By the same law of association we go on to infer, by the deductive syllogism, that, wherever there is resemblance, there what we have already ascertained about one thing may safely be predicated or asserted of the other. The only difference is in the manner of collecting our particular instances, and drawing from them our general conclusions. These operations may be performed loosely or exactly, partially or completely. Our analysis may be misled by a false resemblance, our deduction by an erroneous manner of connecting the two propositions, from which we argue.”

"The syllogism is the most elementary mode of thought next to the mere apprehension of a quality in anything, for it is simply the combination of two apprehensions, which are connected in the mind by something, which is common to both. On meeting any object, which resembles an object known already, the mind, obeying its law of coincidence, substitutes it in thought for the object known already, and imputes to it whatever qualities belong to that object. The hypothetical syllogism is, in reality, only the ordinary syllogism, altered in expression, and may easily be converted into it."

"The distinction between inductive and deductive reasoning is sometimes pressed too far, as if the syllogism belonged to the latter only. But even induction uses the syllogism, and cannot proceed without it. In every step of its researches induction uses the syllogism as its instrument *provisionally* for classification and generalisation. Each particular instance, which meets us is, so to speak, a supposed universal for the time being, and retains the force of an universal statement until dethroned by wider experiences. One rose must stand as the representative in the mind of all roses, till the mind lights on another. The process, which is always at work in the mind of a child, as soon as it begins to take notice, is the same process in embryo as that, by which the philosopher elaborates his theories. The form of the syllogisms is identical. The connecting link between the two objects, which the mind endeavours to adjust within itself in due relation to one another, is the

little word, which expresses in its strictest sense identity of extension and intention, and, used loosely, mere resemblance. 'This *is* that' may express any degree of coincidence from absolute identity to a mere likeness in appearance. For example a child perceives, that an object called a stone is heavy, and by a law, which it must obey, it argues, that a something else, which seems to resemble this stone, has the same properties ; and, accordingly, that this also is heavy. The process, by which the inductive philosopher establishes his general statement is precisely similar. Certain eagles, for instance, he learns by observation, have a certain habit ; all eagles, so far as he knows, are like these eagles ; therefore, he infers, all eagles have this habit. To a child even the sameness of name brings with it the sense of actual identity. A child accustomed to any one, for instance, called John, cannot at first understand without difficulty, that there can be another person of that name, another and not the same. What is called 'à priori' reasoning is, if we analyse it, reasoning 'à posteriori,' done hastily and superficially, and therefore done wrong. The facts, from which it argues, are only guesses."

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APPENDIX B. (See p. x.)

ARISTOTLE.

"ABOUT Aristotle as about Shakspeare, Homer, and others pre-eminently great, there hangs a haze of uncertainty, disappointing the inquirer. But enough, at least, is certain to enable one to form a notion of the philosopher as a man. The most striking point in the anecdotes, which are recorded of him is the very thing, which stamps his philosophy with its individuality, and which is the keynote of his system. It is a more than ordinary power of balancing things opposite, of adjusting, of reconciling them. This habit of mind shows itself in small things as in great; in the trivialities of daily life, as well as in its sterner experiences. The very phrase—one thoroughly characteristic of the Greek nation generally, and of their subtle discernment, but peculiarly the property of Aristotle—the phrase, which recurs so continually in his writings, and by which he emphasises his distinctions, is irresistibly recalled by his biography. He seems continually endeavouring, and successfully, to counteract natural infirmities—to overcome, by the adaptation of himself, the force of uncongenial circumstances. He was, we are told, like the great Apostle, of a mean and contemptible presence; but he was studiously careful in his dress. He was of a

weakly and sickly constitution ; but he got the better of it by temperance and by attention to rules of diet. He was of a restless and inquisitive temperament. 'Tell me the cause,' he said to his physician, 'treat me not as a driver of oxen or a digger—but tell me the cause, and you shall find me obedient !' He drove his aged teacher, it is related, to take refuge in the garden by the importunity of his questionings. But he could restrain this propensity, when necessary. With his usual tact he cautioned Callisthenes, his democratic disciple, to converse seldom and very courteously with his royal patron, Alexander. He thought, studied, wrote about politics and yet had the good sense to keep himself clear of the political entanglements around him ; and when at last the malice of his enemies expelled him from Athens, he accepted this reverse with the equanimity of a true philosopher. Probably like the king-maker of our own country, he reigned by deputy ; and through his royal pupil, exercised an indirect but incalculable influence on the policy of Macedon and on the destinies of the world.

"But there is another characteristic of the man to be noticed—not less important than this, and closely allied to it. Any one, who has read even a few pages only of Aristotle's treatises, cannot but mark the brevity and terseness of his style. It is, in a word—inappropriate as the epithet may sound when applied to a dweller beside the Ilissus—thoroughly Laconic. But this is not all. A closer acquaintance detects beneath this epigrammatic terseness a vein of irony ;

not of irony such as Socrates delighted in, humorous and genial, but severe, caustic, and incisive. Socrates is quite willing to make himself ridiculous, if only he can make the truth clearer in the end. He does not at all object to his own snub nose being used as an illustration, nay, he is the first to call attention to it, provided that it may serve his purpose, and help on his argument. He can bear to have the laugh against him for the moment, knowing that, in the sequel of the controversy, 'he will laugh who wins.' Aristotle is too self-contained, too proud, too reserved to stoop thus. His irony is that of a man who sees a something wanting everywhere; who is painfully alive to the defects and mistakes of others; who detests any overstatement, even when he feels confident of his position, and dreads the interference of that 'forward and delusive faculty,' as it has been termed, the imagination; who feels constrained to own with a sigh, after all researches, that 'what is, must be.'

"The anecdotes of Aristotle prepare us for all this. They are so consistent with one another, so accordant with these peculiarities, that they warn us to make allowance, when we come to his writings, for this 'enstatic' habit of mind, this scrupulosity in objecting. When asked, 'What grows old' soon?' he is said to have answered, 'Gratitude;'¹ and he defined hope as 'the dream of one awakened.'¹ Cautious to the last, he shunned even on his deathbed

¹ Rather, "a waking dream," "a day-dream."

to commit himself in favour either of Theophrastus or Menedemus, who both claimed the honour of succeeding him. He merely indicated the one, whom he preferred by the words, 'The Lesbian is the sweeter.' These casual traits are in perfect keeping with his philosophy. While Plato strikes a full, resounding chord, Aristotle thinks and writes in a minor key. His very pride, as often happens lends to his self-restraint an air of humility. He will not soar too high, because he foresees the fall. He is too well aware of possible objections even to his own most cherished theories, to expose them more than is absolutely needful, or to trust himself to a general statement, which he does not feel able to substantiate. His was a thoroughly critical, judicial mind. He was a thorough man of the world, as well as a professor of philosophy. He would rather build slowly and surely than see his cloud-castles toppling over at the breath of adverse winds. Accordingly the school, which Aristotle founded, is small and insignificant; but the influence, which Aristotle has exercised on the world at large, is unequalled in history.

"Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle are a great triumvirate; partitioning among themselves the empire of Ancient Philosophy. Their specialities are too diverse to come into serious collision. The former excel respectively in analysis and synthesis; Aristotle in the harmonious combination of these two things. Socrates leads the way by levelling to the ground the strongholds of an unreasonable scepticism; Plato, like

an Eastern conqueror, dreaming of a universal empire, overruns a vast extent of territory; Aristotle, like a Roman law-giver, consolidates the empire by marshalling its heterogeneous elements in a more firmly organised policy. Or, to take a homelier illustration, Socrates breaks up the fallow ground, and eradicates the noxious overgrowth of weeds; Plato scatters the seeds with a liberal hand; Aristotle comes last to gather in the harvest, carefully severing facts from figments. Socrates is essentially destructive and refutative, even while he is laying his foundations in the incontrovertible truths of morality. Plato, while developing the same elenctic method, uses the abundant materials at his command to construct a system of his own. The strength of Aristotle shows itself especially in unravelling the ingenious complications of his idealistic predecessor, in reducing impracticable theories to more manageable dimensions, in restricting their pretensions by recourse to facts. Accordingly, Plato was the favourite of the Christian Church, while on the aggressive against Paganism, while struggling to extend its influence over regions of thought as yet unsubdued; Aristotle supplanted Plato so soon as it became necessary rather to consolidate, what had been acquired, than to attempt new conquests."

APPENDIX C. (See p. 13.)

THE SCULPTOR.

I.

"CHISEL in hand stood a sculptor boy,
With a marble block before him ;
And a gleam of joy lit up his eye,
As an angel dream pass'd o'er him.
He carved that dream on the shapeless stone
With many a sharp incision ;
That angel dream he had made his own,
His own that Angel Vision.

II.

Sculptors of Life are we, as we stand
With our souls uncarved before us,
Waiting the time, till at God's command
Our Life dream passes o'er us.
If we carve that dream on the shapeless soul,
With many a sharp incision,
That angel dream we have made our own,
Our own that Angel Vision."

ANON.

APPENDIX D. (See p. 21.)

FREEWILL.

"THE will acts 'in accordance with motive'; and to suppose that the will can 'break loose from continuity and act without cause' is as absurd, it is added, as to suppose 'a balance sometimes acting in the usual way, but also possessed of the faculty of turning by itself, without or against its weight.'¹ But we do not say that the will is 'acting without cause'; for the will itself is an item in the causation; nay, to omit the will is to omit the most important factor in the calculation. We do not say that the will is 'breaking loose from continuity,' for the will itself is a connecting link in the chain of continuity. With contending motives equal, as sometimes happens, a man would be as powerless to stir one way or the other, as the ass between the two bundles of hay, but for the intervention of the will. Even with one motive, to all appearance and by all laws of experience outweighing the other, the will, simply by its own adhesion, can reverse the balance. The tender maiden chooses rather to endure the rack or the dungeon than succumb to the torturer. The veteran confessor for his faith frustrates all the hopes of his disciples by preferring shame to suffering. The scales are

¹ E. B. TYLER, "Primitive Culture," I. 3.

adjusted ; the weightier motive, be it of a better or a worse sort, an appetite, an ambition, a self-devotion to some unselfish cause, is sinking down ; the lighter kicks the beam ; but the will, like the victorious Gaul, flings its sword into the scale, and all is changed in a moment. True, the weights in these scales have no fixed intrinsic value, but one which varies subjectively to each of us. Even causes external to us, hereditary predispositions, early influences, local associations, all must be counted in. True, habitual indulgence may give to a propensity a force not its own, may even make it, by long persistence, a tyrant of that, to which it should be a servant and an instrument. True, the will may become so enfeebled in its miserable thralldom, that only by an extraordinary effort can it be free. Still, after all, the final verdict in that little court, where each man presides, arbiter of his own actions, of his own happiness, is not in the power of any propensity or inclination, but rests with himself, and resides in the conscious energy of his will."—*Characteristics of Christian Morality*, 2nd edition, pp. 19-21.

"It is impossible to define motives accurately, even our own. We cannot say sometimes, why we do a thing. Every reason may be against it—common sense, habit, inclination, experience, duty, all may be pulling one way, and yet we tear ourselves loose and do the thing."—*Anon.*

APPENDIX E. (See p. 28.)

THE INTELLECT.

IN one respect, the Aristotelian way of speaking on this point, though questionable as attributing to the intellect a function, which seems more properly to belong to something in man superior to the intellect (his will), is invaluable, as reminding, that it is the one and the same faculty, which appreciates scientific truth, artistic beauty, moral goodness, though in one kind of appreciation it may be more liable to disturbance from emotional influences, than in another. The common expression "the conscious will" may be defensible, as a compendious way of saying, that the personality, which decides, is able so to detach and project itself from itself, as to criticise itself, but it may mislead, if taken to mean, that consciousness is not a function of the intellect.

APPENDIX F. (See p. 36.)

A LIBERAL EDUCATION.

"THAT man, I think, has had a liberal education, who has been so trained in youth, that his body is the ready servant of his will, and does with ease and pleasure all the work, that as a mechanism it is capable of; whose intellect is a clear, cold, logic engine, with all its parts of equal strength, and in smooth working order; ready, like a steam-engine, to be turned to any kind of work, and spin the gossamers as well as forge the anchors of the mind; whose mind is stored with the great and fundamental truths of nature, and laws of her operations; one who, no stunted ascetic, is full of life and fire, but whose passions are trained to come to heel by a vigorous will, the servant of a tender conscience; who has learned to love all beauty whether of nature or art, to hate all vileness, and to respect others as himself."—PROFESSOR HUXLEY.

APPENDIX G. (See p. 46.)

SELF-LOVE.

"ARISTOTELIANISM and Christianity both promise happiness; the former proposes it as an end in itself; the latter proposes duty as the end of life, and happiness as a reward for those, who do their duty for duty's sake, and not from selfish motives. The Apostle enjoins the Christians to practise things, that are "lovely and of good report," but it is in order that their Master may not be spoken against, and that their Father in Heaven may be glorified. With Aristotle honour is an end in itself. Whatever brings with it praise and renown, whatever enhances a man's reputation among his fellow citizens is right; and the verdict admits of no reversal by a higher tribunal. Exile was ignominious beyond what we with our notions can understand, simply because to be expelled in disgrace by his neighbours branded a man as having forfeited the good opinion, which was the only criterion of virtue."

The Eastern apologue illustrates quaintly the self-renunciation of faith.

"One night Abû Yezid Bestâmi being alone in his cell and plunged in ecstasy, cried out in his vivid apprehension of the feebleness and impotence of human nature, 'O, my God, when shall I unite

myself and Thee? O God most high how long wilt Thou leave me to consume away in this cruel separation? When wilt Thou give me the wine of Thy enjoyment?' Then a voice from out of the impenetrable abode of the Divine Majesty sounded above his head, and he heard the words 'Abû Yezid, the Thou is still with thee. If thou wilt attain unto Me, quit thyself and come.'" And so Jelâlu D-Dîn, the great Muslim saint and teacher, in the Mesuevî.—"One knocked at the door of the Beloved and a voice from within said:—'Who is there?' Then he answered: '*It is I.*' The voice replied: 'This house will not hold *me* and *thee!*' So the door remained shut. The lover retired to a wilderness and spent some time in solitude, fasting, and prayer. One year elapsed, when he again returned and knocked at the door. 'Who is there?' said the voice. The lover answered, '*It is Thou.*' Then the door was opened."—W. S. LILLY, *Ancient Religion and Modern Thought*. 2nd Edition.

APPENDIX H. (See p. 56.)

"THE GOLDEN MEAN."

"ARISTOTLE evidently felt a strong repugnance to the idea of a "summum bonum." By a natural reaction of thought he suspected, that the enquiry after any such thing would prove the pursuit of a chimera. He would not waste his time and trouble on anything so unpractical. His strength lay, and he knew it, in discriminating among the various circumstances of time, place, occasion, &c., which give its proper character to any particular action. The same action, he was well aware, may be worthy of praise or blame, according to the manner, in which it is done, the causes and consequences, which belong to it. Killing an invading foe in battle, for instance, and killing the friend, who sits beside one at a feast, are the same action, and yet as contrary as light and darkness. Aristotle would not lend himself to what had proved a fruitless quest to Plato. Still he felt, as every one, who thinks at all, must feel, that there is at the bottom an unity of principle in all manifestations of goodness, happiness, beauty, and truth.¹ He could see, that there is a proportionateness, invariably, which determines the fitness of every action, and which, as it is observed or disregarded, characterises every action as good or evil."

¹ St. Paul recognises this moral unity in using the same word, *πλεονεξία*, for covetousness and lust.

APPENDIX I. (See p. 65.)

SLAVERY.

“CHRISTIANITY may allow slavery, under certain modifications, as a temporary necessity, as a lesser evil than lawlessness and anarchy, as the only way to restrain brute force, until the slave can be educated for citizenship; but Christianity never forgets, that slave as well as freeman has inalienable rights, which belong to every being endowed with free will and an heir of immortality.”

APPENDIX J. (See p. 72.)

PANTHEISM AND POLYTHEISM.

“A GOOD and thoughtful man in those days had simply to choose between such impersonations of vice and folly as were the deities of the vulgar mythology, and a mere abstraction, a being too superior to take any notice of men. The prayer of the philosopher, if ever the ineradicable instinct of prayer forced its way upward from his soul would naturally be—

‘Thou Great First Cause least understood.’

Or if in thought the philosopher could raise himself to the conception of a Person, in whom the attributes of divinity might worthily reside, he would still be offering his homages to an ‘unknown God,’ to ‘One by many names adored, Jehovah, Jove, or Lord.’ ”

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